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FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTS*
JOHN A. ROBERTSON**
Fetal tissue divides readily and contains the precursor cells for many
important somatic functions. Tissue transplant from aborted fetuses may
thus restore function in persons suffering from degenerative neurological
diseases, from diabetes and from a variety of blood and immune system
disorders. Although still highly experimental, the clinical potential of
fetal tissue warrants further investigation.
Yet many people have voiced strong ethical objections to fetal tissue
transplants.' Right to life groups fear that it will legitimate and en-
courage abortion.' Others foresee women becoming pregnant and abort-
ing to produce fetal tissue, possibly creating a market for abortion. The
most extreme opponents urge legal prohibitions on tissue transplants
from induced abortions and a ban on federal funding of fetal tissue re-
* Copyright 1988 John A. Robertson.
** Baker & Botts Professor, University of Texas at Austin, School of Law. This article is
based on a paper presented at The Health Law Teachers Conference of the American Society of Law
and Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, June 3, 1988. Portions of this article appear in Rights,
Symbolism and Public Policy in Fetal Tissue Transplants, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (1988)
(forthcoming).
The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Richard Markovits, Douglas Laycock, Mike
Sharlot, Nicholas Terry, George Annas, Arthur Caplan, Albert R. Jonson, Pat Cain, Jean Love,
Alan Fine, Mary Mahowald and Stuart Youngner on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. While research with live fetuses ex utero and fetuses about to be aborted has previously
been the subject of controversy, research on dead aborted fetuses has long occurred without much
conflict. The novelty of fetal brain tissue transplants has reopened an ethical, legal and policy debate
about disposition of aborted fetuses.
2. Lewin, Medical Use of Fetal Tissue Spurs New Abortion Debate, N.Y. Times, August 16,
1987, at 1, col. 5.
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search. More moderate opponents call for strict regulation of the cir-
cumstances in which fetal tissue is obtained, including a ban on the sale
of fetal tissue and intrafamilial or designated tissue donations.3
The emerging controversy over fetal tissue transplants illustrates once
again the power of medical innovation to challenge ethical norms and
social practices. The challenge must be met if medical progress in this
important area is to occur. To guide the development of public policy,
this article examines key ethical, legal and policy issues presented by fetal
tissue transplants.
I. BENEFITS, TISSUE SOURCE AND CONTROVERSY
Scientists have engaged in research with fetal tissue for many years,
but only recently has the possibility of transplanting fetal tissue to cure
or alleviate symptoms in sick patients seemed feasible on a large scale.
Before addressing ethical and legal issues, a brief description of the po-
tential benefits and sources of fetal tissue transplants and the ethical con-
troversy they have engendered is in order.
A. Potential Applications
While physicians have performed relatively few transplants to humans
thus far, considerable animal research involving human fetal tissue sug-
gests that it may be an effective therapy for at least two severe chronic
diseases-Parkinson's disease and diabetes. Research also indicates
human fetal tissue has potential application to a wide variety of other
disorders.
Parkinson's disease is a chronic, progressive degenerative disease that
affects more than 1.5 million Americans. The disease causes the brain to
lose the capacity to produce essential neurotransmitters. As a result, the
patient suffers from tremors, rigidity, paralysis and eventually dies. Ex-
tensive work with animal models suggests that inserting fetal cells in the
affected part of the brain will produce the missing neurotransmitters in
quantities sufficient to alleviate symptoms and prevent further deteriora-
tion.5 Patients suffering from other central nervous system disorders,
3. For a discussion of these issues, see infra notes 140-57 and accompanying text.
4. See Lewin, supra note 2.
5. Rohter, Fetal Tissue Aids Two Parkinson Cases, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1988, at B13, col. 1;
Fine, The Ethics of Fetal Tissue Transplants, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June-July 1988, at 5. Fine
describes the disease as occurring
when neurons degenerate in the region of the midbrain called the substantia nigra. Nor-
[Vol. 66:443
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss3/2
FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTS
such as Alzheimer's disease, amytropic lateral sclerosis, and Hunting-
ton's chorea, may also benefit from fetal transplants.6
Fetal transplants also offer a promising therapy for the million Ameri-
cans who suffer from juvenile diabetes. While the disease is manageable
to varying degrees with exogenous insulin, the lives of these people are
often shortened by accelerated atherosclerosis, renal disorders and other
serious problems. Extensive animal studies suggest that transplantation
of fetal pancreatic islet cells into the diabetic patient could produce a
normal supply of insulin and prevent further symptoms. Successful fetal
islet transplants could benefit an estimated 700,000-900,000 of these pa-
tients, at great savings to the community.7
While patients with Parkinson's disease and diabetes are the most
likely beneficiaries of fetal tissue transplants, other patients may also ben-
efit. Fetal liver, the source of the hematopoietic cells which produce the
blood and immune system, may provide an effective remedy for radiation
sickness, aplastic anemia and other hemoglobinopathies. Future applica-
tions to sickle cell anemia and thalassemia, to diseases of the immune
system, such as AIDS and rheumoarthritis, and to diseases of aging are
also possible.8
Research with fetal tissue may also yield essential information about
the oncogenesis of early development cancers; the regulation, growth, de-
velopment and regeneration of tissue as an alternative to transplant ther-
apy; the effect of environmental factors on the fetus; the genesis of
diseases of development, such as respiratory distress syndrome and
hemoglobinopathies; and the pathogenesis of the HIV virus implicated in
AIDS. Fetal tissue may also serve as a source of biologic substances for
research and therapy.9
mally, fibers from these cells secrete the chemical dopamine in forebrain regions important
for regulating movement. In the absence of normal dopamine secretion, the patient suffers
from a variety of impairments including rigidity, difficulty initiating movements and
tremors.
Id.
6. See supra note 2.
7. Statement of Kevin Lafferty, Ph.D., National Disease Research Interchange Meeting on
Fetal Transplants (April 1I, 1988).
8. Statement of Dr. Robert Gale, National Disease Research Interchange Meeting on Fetal
Transplants (April 11, 1988).
9. Statement of Dr. William Raub, National Disease Research Interchange Meeting on Fetal
Transplants (April 11, 1988).
1988]
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B. Source and Supply of Fetal Tissue
The one and a half million abortions performed annually in the United
States appear adequate to supply fetal tissue for research and therapy for
the foreseeable future. Nearly eighty percent of induced abortions are
performed between the sixth and eleventh weeks of gestation, at which
time neural and other tissue is sufficiently developed to be retrieved and
transplanted.10 Abortions performed at fourteen to sixteen weeks pro-
vide fetal pancreases used in diabetes research, but it may be possible to
use pancreases retrieved earlier.
Past research with fetal tissue has used fetal tissue obtained through
informal contacts between researchers and physicians doing abortions,
usually in the same institution. Recently, intermediary organizations
that retrieve fetal tissue from abortion facilities and distribute it to re-
searchers have arisen. 1 One may expect more such bodies to develop,
with most fetal tissue retrieved by specialized tissue or organ procure-
ment agencies. In some cases, for-profit firms that specialize in process-
ing the tissue for transplant may enter the field.2
Answers to several questions related to the needed supply of fetal tis-
sue must await further research. For example, the number of fetuses
needed to produce a successful neural or pancreatic graft is unknown.' 3
Progress in replicating and growing fetal cell lines in culture may reduce
the number of aborted fetuses needed for therapeutic purposes. The abil-
ity to freeze fetal cells will enhance the ability to tissue-type and study for
infection, and allow retrieved tissue to be transported long distances as
solid organs and other tissue now are. Major questions about histocom-
patibility remain unsolved. In the long run, drugs that directly supply
the missing biological factors or substances will probably replace fetal
tissue transplants.14
10. Fine, supra note 5, at 6-7.
11. The National Disease Research Interchange of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania is one such
intermediary.
12. Hana Biologies, Inc., a publicly traded company, is now acquiring fetal tissue to study the
possible development of fetal islet cells for transplant to diabetic patients.
13. Statement of Drs. Kevin Lafferty and Lars Olson, at NIH Panel on Fetal Tissue Transplan-
tation Research (Sept. 21, 1988).
14. Statement of Dr. William Moscona, NIH Panel on Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research
(Sept. 21, 1988).
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C. The Ethical Controversy
Ethical duties of beneficence require curing disease and alleviating suf-
fering wherever possible. If fetal tissue transplants will help patients suf-
fering from Parkinson's disease, diabetes and other disorders, a prima
facie obligation to pursue those remedies exists, defeasible only if fetal
tissue could not be ethically obtained. 5
Fetal tissue for transplant is obtained from intentional destruction of
fetuses-a legal practice that many persons view as immoral. 6 In their
view, research or therapy with aborted fetuses legitimizes or even encour-
ages abortion, opening the door to women conceiving and aborting solely
to get tissue for transplant. The good to patients, in their view, is out-
weighed by the harm to fetuses and the denigration of women that
thereby occurs.
The fetal tissue transplant controversy thus has an architecture similar
to many bioethical debates, with a novel twist because of the contested
status of the fetus and abortion. Respect for the needs of sick patients
appears to conflict with respect for prenatal human life and larger socie-
tal moral concerns. Closer analysis is necessary to show whether this
apparent conflict is real and how it may or should be resolved.
The following discussion assumes that the experimental or clinical use
of tissue from aborted fetuses is medically justified to cure, alleviate
symptoms of, or greatly improve the quality of life of patients suffering
from a variety of life-threatening or seriously debilitating diseases. 7 It
first analyzes ethical objections based on fetal and maternal welfare and
then discusses legal and regulatory issues.
II. ISSUES OF FETAL STATUS AND WELFARE
The main ethical objection to fetal tissue transplants is the need to rely
15. Lewin, supra note 2. These issues arise even though tissue is obtained from a fetus that is
clearly dead. Further ethical problems would arise if tissue had to be procured from an aborted fetus
that was still alive. See infra notes 175-82 and accompanying text.
16. Wide opposition to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) continues to exist. See ABORTION
AND THE CONSTITUTION (D. Horan, E. Grant & P. Cunningham ed. 1988).
17. The assumption of great benefit subtly changes the nature of the current debate, since there
is no guarantee at the present time that the great potential of fetal tissue transplants in curing disease
or alleviating symptoms will be achieved. The case for incurring the symbolic costs of creating and
destroying fetuses to obtain tissue for transplants weakens considerably as the certainty or magni-
tude of benefit falls. (For a definition of "symbolic costs" see infra note 51). The success factor
should thus be factored into the ethical and legal analysis that follows.
1988]
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on induced abortions to obtain fetal tissue.18 Like cadaveric organ pro-
curement, fetal transplants depend upon a death to enable good to an-
other to occur. But cadaveric organs are obtained only after the tragic
death of the organ source, with strict protections ensuring that the
source's interests are not compromised for the purpose of procuring
organs.19
By contrast, the death of the fetus that provides tissue for transplant is
deliberate. The donor-the woman providing the tissue-chooses to kill
the fetus for reasons usually unrelated to tissue procurement. Although
the abortion producing the tissue is legal and occurs for reasons unre-
lated to tissue procurement, many people who view abortion as immoral
argue that procuring fetal tissue disrespects and exploits the aborted fe-
tus. They fear that fetal tissue transplants will legitimize and further
entrench abortion, and even lead to pregnancy and abortion to produce
tissue for transplant.' Accordingly, they would drastically limit or even
prohibit all fetal tissue transplants, or at least remove the government
from funding research or therapy with fetal tissue.
Because ethical objections based on concern for the fetus are at the
heart of the fetal tissue transplant debate, an extended analysis of the
ethical legitimacy of fetal tissue transplants from induced abortions fol-
lows. A key distinction in this analysis is between tissue obtained from
fetuses aborted for family planning reasons and fetuses aborted to obtain
tissue for transplant.
A. Use of Fetuses Aborted For Family Planning Purposes
Over a million and a half abortions occur in the United States every
year, and over ninety-five percent of them occur in the first trimester.21
Whether pregnancy occurs from contraceptive failure or sheer negli-
gence, most of these abortions are done to avoid an unwanted preg-
18. Tissue from spontaneously aborted (miscarried) fetuses is not an adequate substitute be.
cause of the probability that fetal pathology triggered the miscarriage, and the indeterminate delay
between fetal death and expulsion from the uterus. In addition, enormous logistical problems in
recovering and processing such tissue can arise. See Fine, supra note 5, at 6.
19. Cadaveric organ sources must be brain dead, as determined by physicians who have no role
in the transplant itself. The death of the organ source usually results from events such as trauma,
accident, suicide or homicide that are illegal or socially undesirable. The person consenting to use of
the cadaveric organs does not usually cause the death of the organ source.
20. Lewin, supra note 2.
21. Henshaw, Binkin, Blaine & Smith, A Portrait of American Women Who Obtain Abortions,
17 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 90, 91 (1985).
[Vol. 66:443
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nancy-broadly speaking, for family planning purposes.2 2 The aborted
fetuses, often macerated or a mass of tissue, are then incinerated or
otherwise discarded.23 Fetal tissue transplants would, presumably with
the mother's consent, salvage some of that tissue to benefit patients suf-
fering from serious disease.
Two ethical arguments have been made against use of tissue from
abortions induced to end an unwanted pregnancy.2" Both rest on the
premise that abortion is morally abhorrent, a premise not universally
held in our pluralistic society. If the premise is rejected, the use of fetal
tissue from family planning abortions poses no major ethical problem.25
Even assuming the immorality of abortion, however, it does not follow
that tissue transplants from such abortions are also immoral. These ethi-
cal objections are insufficient to justify a ban on tissue transplants from
fetuses aborted to end an unwanted pregnancy.26
1. Complicity in Abortion
A major ethical objection to use of tissue from family planning abor-
tions is the idea of complicity in the abortion that provides the fetal tis-
sue. The premise here is that knowingly profiting from an evil done to
others makes one a moral accomplice in the commission of that evil.2 7 If
22. The term "family planning abortions" might seem unnecessarily euphemistic to some per-
sons. The intent is to denote those abortions that will occur regardless of research with fetal tissue
or fetal tissue transplants. In most cases they are sought because of the woman's desire to avoid
taking on family or childrearing responsibilities, and thus are designated, for want of a better term,
abortions done for "family planning" purposes.
23. Some jurisdictions have enacted fetal disposal laws that aim to protect public health or
demonstrate respect for aborted fetuses. See infra note 134.
24. A third "ethical" objection is that research is further "exploitation" of the fetus that has
already been "exploited" by the abortion. But this objection misundertands the practice at issue.
Fetal tissue for transplant is obtained from dead fetuses. Once dead, the fetus no longer can be
"exploited" or harmed. Statement of Dr. John Wilkie, National Right to Life Committee, NIH
Panel on Fetal Tissue Transplant Research (Sept. 22, 1988).
25. Other ethical issues such as the content, the process and the timing of obtaining informed
consent and the risk of commercialization would also arise, but these pose no major barrier to con-
ducting such research.
26. However, recipients, physicians, and other participants in the transplant process who object
to use of fetal tissue from aborted fetuses should be entitled to know the source of fetal tissue that is
being transplanted, so that they may refuse to participate.
27. People's practice in this regard is inconsistent and not easily subject to clear lines. It is said
that behind every great fortune lies a crime, yet we seldom seek to parse out those connections. As
Henry Fairlie has noted, "[W]ith whatever corruptions and brutality an American fortune has been
amassed, it is laundered within one generation. The money sticks, but not the filth." Fairlie,
Shamala: A Washington Success Story, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 22, 1988 at 21, 22. Thus, by not
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induced abortions are evil, transplanting fetal remains makes one morally
complicitous in the evil that makes the transplant possible.
Yet even proponents of the complicity argument are not quite so ex-
treme, recognizing that not all situations of later benefit make one an
accomplice in the evil act from which benefits are derived. For example,
James Burtchaell, a leading articulator of the complicity objection,
claims that complicity occurs not merely from partaking of benefit, but
only when one enters into a "supportive alliance" with the underlying
evil that makes the benefit possible.2" In discussing different relation-
ships to an underlying evil, he distinguishes "a neutral or even an oppo-
nent and an ally from the way in which one does or does not hold oneself
apart from the enterprise and its purposes."29 Later he states that "it is
the sort of association which implies and engenders approbation that cre-
ates moral complicity. This situation is detectable when the associate's
ability to condemn the activity atrophies.""0
In light of Burtchaell's analysis of complicity, it is unclear why he
finds the researcher using fetal tissue from an elective abortion necessar-
ily to be an accomplice to the abortionist and the woman choosing abor-
tion. The researcher and transplant patient ordinarily will be removed
from the abortion process: they will not have requested the abortion, and
will have no knowledge of who performed it or where it occurred. A
third party intermediary will procure the tissue for the researcher.31 The
abortion will have occurred for reasons unrelated to tissue procurement.
The researcher and transplant patient might even be morally opposed to
abortion, and surely will suffer no moral disintegration because they
inquiring closely into the origin of the money used in most transactions, the market system "dirties"
everyone's hands. The grocer who sells food to the physician who performs abortions enables the
physician to continue his work and the grocer is paid with the proceeds from previous abortions. See
G. HIGGINS, KENNEDY FOR THE DEFENSE 34-35 (1980) for a graphic presentation of this dilemma
for a criminal defense attorney.
28. Burtchaell, Case Study: University Policy on Experimental Use of Aborted Fetal Tissue,
IRB: A REVIEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, July-Aug. 1988, at 7. He acknowledges that
complicity is a contingent relationship which depends on judgment over which reasonable persons
might disagree. Id. at 8. While Burtchaell poses the question as one of complicity, one might argue
that the problem is really one of "dirty hands" or association with the previous evil, which raises a
different set ofconcerns. The extent to which one's hands are "dirtied" is even more clearly a matter
of judgment.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id.
31. See supra notes 11, 12, and infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
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choose to salvage some good from an abortion that will occur regardless
of their research or therapeutic goals.
The donation of organs and cadavers from homicide victims provides a
useful analogy. Families of murder victims (or coroners if no family is
known) are often asked to donate organs and bodies for research, therapy
and education. If they consent, organ procurement agencies will coordi-
nate the retrieval and distribution of organs. No one would seriously
argue that the surgeon who transplants the victim's kidneys, heart, liver,
or corneas into a needy recipient is thereby an accomplice in the homi-
cide that made the organs available for transplant, even if he knows their
source. Nor is the recipient of the transplanted organs or the medical
student who uses the cadaver of a murder victim to study anatomy an
accomplice in the homicide.
If organs from murder and accident victims may be used without com-
plicity in the murder or accident that makes the organs available, then
fetal remains could also be used without complicity in the abortion.32
The physician and patient benefiting from the homicide or abortion do
not, by salvaging some good from an independently caused death, be-
come moral accomplices in the death that makes organs available.
Burtchaeil's approach to the problem of complicity assumes that re-
searchers necessarily applaud the underlying act of abortion, thereby al-
lying themselves with it. One may benefit from another's evil act,
however, without applauding or approving of that evil. X may disap-
prove of Y's murder of Z, even though X gains an inheritance or a pro-
motion as a result. Indeed, one might even question Burtchaell's
assumption that X has complicity in Y's prior act even if he subsequently
applauds it. Applauding Y's murder of Z might show a design to bring
about the murder it the first place, or be viewed as insensitive or callous.
But it alone would not make one morally responsible for-an accomplice
in-the murder that has already occurred. In any event, the willingness
to derive benefit from another's wrongful death does not create complic-
ity in that death because it is a contingent event over which the persons
who benefit had no control.33
32. For example, suppose X murdered Y, a woman who was three months pregnant at the time.
Surely if her husband, Z, could consent to donation of I's organs for transplant to A, he should be
free to consent to donation of the dead fetus' organs to B as well, even though the fetus has been
intentionally killed. Intentional, legal killing by abortion should not change B's ability to obtain fetal
organs for transplant.
33. The question of encouraging future abortions, which are performed to obtain tissue for
1988]
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The complicity argument against use of aborted fetuses often draws an
analogy to the reluctance to use the results of unethical medical research
carried out by the Nazis. Burtchaell and others have argued that it
would make us retroactive accomplices in the Nazi horrors to use the
products of their unethical and lethal research. 34  As our discussion of
organ donation from homicide victims shows, however, the idea of retro-
active complicity from accepting benefits produced from an earlier evil
act claims more than most people are prepared to accept. 35 A clear sepa-
ration between the perpetrator and beneficiary of the immoral act breaks
the chain of moral complicity for that act.
Thus, one could rely on Nazi-generated data without approving the
horrendous acts of Nazi doctors that made such knowledge possible.
Nor would it necessarily dishonor those unfortunate victims. Indeed, it
could reasonably be viewed as retrospectively honoring them by saving
others. The Jewish doctors who made systematic studies of starvation in
the Warsaw ghetto in order to reap some good from the evil being done
to their brethren were not accomplices in that evil. 36 Nor should one
transplant, is more accurately described as a problem of complicity. This subject is treated infra
notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
34. Burtchaell distinguishes between use of tissue specimens left over from a lethal experiment,
and use of a drug that was developed on the basis of that research, without explaining why complic-
ity would occur in the one case but not in the other. See Burtchaell, supra note 28 at 10. Note that
the claimed complicity is not in torturing the subjects by experimentation, but in benefitting from the
unethical experiment done by others.
Others have objected to citing Nazi data, as demonstrated by a recent controversy over whether
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in considering regulation of certain gasses, should rely
on data from lethal experiments that the Nazis performed on concentration camp victims. The EPA
refused to rely on the data, in order to demonstrate its horror and disapproval of the Nazi practices.
Shabecoff, Head of E.P.A. Bars Nazi Data in Study on Gas, N.Y. Times, March 23, 1988, at 1, col. 5.
While other data may have been available that made reliance on the Nazi studies unnecessary, one
commentator noted that to use unethically obtained data even to save lives "would put us at risk of
retrospectively participating in their torture and death." Howard Spiro, Let Nazi Medical Data
Remind Us of Evil, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, April 19, 1988, at 30, col. 5. A similar issue
has arisen over whether Nazi hypothermia studies may be used in devising ways to save people swept
into icy seas. Minnesota Scientist Plans to Publish Nazi Experiment on Freezing, N.Y. Times, May
12, 1988, at 28, col. 3. At issue here are questions of "dirty hands" and retroactive approval rather
than complicity in the strict sense. See supra note 28.
35. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
36. L. TUSHNET, THE USES OF ADVERSITY: STUDIES OF STARVATION IN THE WARSAW
GHETTO (1966). Indeed, on a recent visit to a former concentration camp in Austria, the Pope
commented that the Holocaust is "a great gift" to us, because it forces us to confront and reflect on
the evil in man. Are we in complicity with the evil done by the Nazis if we make use of this "gift"
that grows out of the evil destruction of millions of persons? John Paul Cites Suffering ofJews, NY.
Times, June 26, 1988, at 6, col. 1.
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consider accomplices the doctors and patients who now benefit from
their studies.
Thus, persons opposed to abortion could reasonably find that use of
fetal tissue from abortions occurring for reasons unrelated to tissue pro-
curement does not make one an accomplice in the abortion that makes
the tissue available. If the complicity claim is doubtful when the under-
lying immorality of the act is clear, as with Nazi-produced data or trans-
plants from murder victims, it is considerably weakened when the act
making the benefit possible is legal and its immorality is vigorously de-
bated, as is the case with abortion. The risk of retroactive complicity in
an abortion performed for reasons unrelated to tissue procurement does
not ethically justify denying fetal tissue to researchers or needy trans-
plant recipients.
2. Legitimize, Entrench and Encourage Abortion
A second objection is that salvaging tissue for transplant from aborted
fetuses will make abortion less morally offensive and more easily toler-
ated both for individual pregnant women and for society. Those who
object believe the result will be to so dilute the perceived immorality and
undesirability of abortion as to transform it into a morally positive act.
This will encourage abortions that would not otherwise occur, and dilute
support for reversing the legal acceptability of abortion, in effect creating
complicity in future abortions.37
But the feared impact on abortion attitudes is highly speculative, par-
ticularly at a time when few fetal transplants have yet occurred. There is
good reason to think that fetal tissue transplants will have little effect on
abortion attitudes and practices. For example, the possibility of donating
tissue for transplant may have little effect on individual abortion deci-
sions. The main motivation for most abortions is the desire to avoid the
burdens of an unwanted pregnancy. The fact that fetal remains may be
donated for transplant may be of little significance in the total array of
factors that lead a woman to abort a pregnancy.
Even if women feel better for having donated fetal tissue, the possibil-
ity of donation alone would lead few women to abort who would not
otherwise have done so. Tissue donation may even have little impact on
37. While fetal tissue donations might, on the margin, produce more abortions than would
otherwise occur, the concern is not with women who conceive for the purpose of obtaining tissue for
transplant. See infra notes 47-60.
1988]
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those women who are highly ambivalent or undecided about abortion,
particularly if the decision to abort must first be made before notice of
the opportunity to donate is offered.38 Of course, some women might
find the chance to donate fetal tissue the deciding factor, but it seems
unlikely that this possibility will greatly increase the number of abortions
that will occur. Speculation of such effects alone does not justify losing
the substantial benefits that fetal tissue transplants can bring.
Nor does the mere fact that fetal tissue is donated for research and
transplant mean that a public otherwise ready to outlaw abortion would
refrain from doing so. The continuing legal acceptance of abortion flows
from the wide disagreement that exists over early fetal status. If a major-
ity agreed that embryos and fetuses should be respected as persons de-
spite the burdens placed on pregnant women, such possible secondary
benefits of induced abortion as fetal tissue transplants would most likely
not prevent a change in the legality of abortion. At the very least, there
is enough doubt about the point to prevent such speculations from stop-
ping the great good that fetal tissue may provide.39
Indeed, one could make the same argument against organ transplants
from homicide, suicide and accident victims. One could argue that the
willingness to use their organs might encourage or legitimate those prac-
tices, or at least make it harder to enact lower speed limits, or seatbelt,
gun control and drunk driving laws to prevent them. After all, the need
to prevent fatal accidents, murder and suicide becomes less pressing if
38. It is difficult to tell whether a general knowledge that fetal tissue transplants occur will
influence the decision of women contemplating abortion even when they are not specifically asked to
donate until after they have decided about the abortion. In a somewhat analogous context, the right
to donate organs for transplant is not thought to lead families to remove life support systems prema-
turely. The issue of whether informed consent to abortion constitutes an inducement is discussed
infra note 82.
39. Although people strongly opposed to abortion might disagree with this analysis, one could
reasonably find the effect of fetal transplant on individual and social practices of abortion to be
marginal, especially if techniques to separate abortion and retrieval of fetal tissue are firmly in place.
Any resulting encouragement of abortion is likely to be too slight to justify foregoing the more likely
benefits from fetal tissue research and therapy.
To pursue the point somewhat further, suppose that fetal tissue transplants increased the number
of abortions by X over the next 5 years, but fetal transplants saved X + Y lives over that same
period. At low values of X and high values of Y fetal transplants would not be unethical, since X
measures unknown or statistical increases in abortion, not unlike the statistical lives lost in selecting
a particular automobile or road design, or building tunnels and suspension bridges. Nor does the
fact that the increased deaths from abortion will occur intentionally change the outcome. Laws
permitting the possession of handguns also produce intentionally caused deaths (usually illegally).
Such statistical risks of intentional or unintentional death become an acceptable cost of achieving the
social policies in question.
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some good to others might come from use of victim organs for trans-
plant. However, the connection is too tenuous and speculative to ban
organ transplants on that basis. It is also tenuous and should be rejected
as a basis for prohibiting fetal tissue transplants.
In sum, fetal tissue transplants, though dependent on abortions in-
duced to prevent unwanted pregnancy, can be sufficiently divorced from
such abortions as to be separately evaluated. Given that abortion is legal
and occurring on a large scale, the willingness to use resulting tissue for
transplant neither creates complicity in past abortions nor appears to en-
courage substantially more abortions than would otherwise have oc-
curred. Such ethical concerns are not sufficient, given the possible good
to others, to justify banning use of fetal tissue for research or therapy.
B. Aborting to Obtain Tissue for Transplant
A more widely shared ethical objection to procuring tissue from in-
duced abortions is the incentive that it will give women to become preg-
nant and abort solely to obtain tissue for transplant. Most commentators
assume that conception and abortion for tissue procurement is so clearly
unethical that the prospect hardly merits discussion. To discourage such
a practice, they would ban all tissue transplants from related persons.'
Indeed, some persons would even ban any use of fetuses aborted for fam-
ily planning reasons simply to minimize the risk that conception and
abortion for transplant purposes will occur.
1. The Need: Unlikely at Present Time
The need to abort solely for transplant purposes could arise in two
situations that do not presently exist. One situation would arise if his-
tocompatibility between the fetus and recipient were necessary for effec-
tive fetal transplants. In that case, tissue from abortions done currently
for family planning reasons would be less desirable or even useless for
transplant purposes.4' Female relatives, spouses or even unrelated com-
patible persons engaged for that purpose might then seek to get pregnant
40. Mahowald, Silver & Ratcheson, The Ethical Options in Transplanting Fetal Tissue, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1987, at 9. See also Fine, supra note 5. An exception is Mary Warren, in
a brief comment that appeared before the current debate arose. Warren, Maquire & Levine, Can the
Fetus Be an Organ Farm?, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23-25 (1978).
41. However, random matching of tissue and immunosuppression of poorer matches would still
occur, as it does with solid organ transplantation, so that family planning abortions might still be an
important source of tissue for transplant.
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in order to obtain properly matched fetal tissue for transplant.42
The second situation would arise if the supply of tissue from family
planning abortions proved inadequate to meet the demand for fetal tis-
sue. For example, the supply of fetal tissue would be reduced if the inci-
dence of surgical abortions were lowered due to medical alternatives such
as RU 486 or more effective contraceptive practices.43 On the other
hand, demand for fetal tissue would greatly increase if fetal tissue trans-
plants proved successful for a large class of patients, such as those suffer-
ing from Parkinson's disease or diabetes.' Pressure on supply might
also occur if tissue from several aborted fetuses were needed to produce
one viable transplant.
At this stage of research, however, it appears likely that the million
plus abortions that occur annually in the United States to end unwanted
pregnancies are more than adequate to supply fetal tissue for most cur-
rent research and transplant purposes. 45 Histocompatibility between tis-
sue source and recipient does not appear necessary for effective fetal
tissue transplants. Indeed, fetal tissue may be immunologically privi-
leged or easily rendered so, thus reducing the chance of rejection and the
need for genetic matching. Progress in propagating cell lines from
aborted fetuses will reduce even more the number of fetuses that are
needed. As research progresses, fetal transplants may be eventually re-
placed by the chemical that the transplant serves to produce.46
At present, the question of aborting to obtain tissue for transplant is a
red herring, because there is little advantage to be gained from such abor-
tions and no one is recommending them. Yet the fear that women will
conceive and abort to produce tissue for transplant has figured so largely
in the current controversy that the ethics of the practice deserve careful
attention-in the unlikely event the need for such abortions arises. Anal-
42. In most instances the conception would probably occur via artificial insemination, with
appropriately matched or chosen sperm. However, in vitro fertilization and egg donation for match-
ing purposes might also occur.
43. RU 486 is an experimental hormonal drug which terminates early pregnancies without the
use of a surgical procedure. Cousinat, Le Strat, Ulmann, Baulieu & Schaison, Termination of Early
Pregnancy by the Progesterone Antagonist RU 486 (Mifepristone), 315 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1565
(1986). Kolata, France and China allow Sale of a Drug for Early Abortion, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24,
1988, at 1, col. 1.
44. Fine has shown that current abortions could supply patients suffering from Parkinson's
disease, but would be inadequate if fetal tissue transplants successfully treated additional diseases
such as diabetes. Fine, supra note 5, at 6.
45. Id.
46. See supra note 14.
[Vol. 66:443
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss3/2
FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTS
ysis will show that such a practice is ethically more complex and defensi-
ble than most commentators have assumed.
2. A Hypothetical Situation
What if the hypothetical possibility became real and diabetes or other
diseases could be effectively treated only with tissue from a fetus that was
genetically related to the recipient? Or the supply of fetal tissue from
elective abortions did not meet the needs of persons with Parkinson's
disease? Consider first the situation where a woman eight weeks preg-
nant with her husband's child learns that tissue from her fetus could cure
severe neurologic disease in herself or a close relative, such as her hus-
band, son or daughter, father or mother, or brother or sister. May she
ethically abort the pregnancy to obtain tissue for transplant to the rela-
tive or herself? Further, if she is not yet pregnant, may she conceive a
fetus that she will then abort to obtain tissue for transplant to herself or
to her relative?47
To focus analysis of this situation on fetal welfare, assume in each case
that no other viable tissue source exists, and that the advanced state of
the neurologic disease has become a major tragedy for the victim and
family. The woman has voluntarily raised the possibility of abortion to
obtain tissue without any direct pressure or inducements from the family
or others. Her husband agrees to an abortion for transplant purposes if
she is willing, but exerts no pressure on her to abort or to conceive for
transplant purposes.
The main concern in this situation is the harm done to the fetus.48 We
discuss first the ethics of aborting for this purpose when the woman is
already pregnant, and then we discuss the situation of conceiving in or-
der to abort for transplant purposes.
a. The Woman is Already Pregnant
If the woman is already pregnant, the question is whether an abortion
47. If conception and abortion for intrafamilial donation is acceptable, the question of impreg-
nating an unrelated woman for this purpose, presumably by noncoital means such as artificial insem-
ination, may then be addressed. Patients without female relatives available to produce fetal tissue
may have to recruit unrelated persons for this purpose. No doubt all patients needs would not be
met unless the donor were paid, which raise the troubling issue of commercialization. See infra
notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
48. Concerns about maternal health and welfare would also arise, but these would seem compa-
rable to or less than similar concerns regarding bone marrow and kidney donations, which are per-
mitted-indeed, are applauded. See infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
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may ethically be done to obtain tissue for transplant, when in the absence
of the need for tissue, the pregnancy would be carried to term. In short,
may a first trimester fetus be sacrificed to procure tissue for transplant?
Assuming a clear and substantial benefit to the recipient, ethical as-
sessment of this situation depends on the value placed on early fetuses
and the reasons deemed acceptable for abortion. Although some people
think that fetuses (and even fertilized eggs and preimplantation embryos)
have the full value of persons, many people find the fetus' inherent status
to depend on the stage of gestational development. 49 An ethically sound
distinction may be made between fetuses that have developed to such a
level of neurologic and cognitive capacity that they are sentient and thus
have interests in themselves, and those which are so neurologically im-
mature that they cannot experience harm. While aborting fetuses at that
earlier stage prevents them from achieving their potential, it does not
harm or wrong them, since they are insufficiently developed to experi-
ence harm.5°
Although aborting the fetus at that early stage presumably does not
harm the fetus, it may impose "symbolic costs" in terms of the general
reduced respect for human life that a willingness to abort early fetuses
connotes.51 Still, the abortion may be ethically acceptable if the good
49. The following analysis assumes that early abortions are ethically acceptable. A more com-
plete analysis of this position is found in Robertson, Gestational Burdens and Fetal Status: A Defense
of Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J. L. & MED. 189 (1988). It should also be noted that rejection of this
premise in favor of treating the fetus as a moral subject with rights from the time of conception
would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that abortion is impermissible, as Judith Jarvis Thom-
son has shown in Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971). In those in-
stances, e.g., rape, contraceptive failure, etc., a woman would not violate the fetus's right in
terminating the pregnancy in order to produce tissue for transplant. Her motivation in avoiding
gestation would not affect her right to do so because she has no independent obligation to continue
the pregnancy. Under this approach, however, a woman would not have a right to abort if she had
conceived for that purpose.
50. All fetuses may have the potential to develop into persons, but only some fetuses-the later
ones-have advanced to the point of sentience and thus have interests in themselves. Potentiality
alone does not give interests or rights in the not yet existent entity who could be brought into being.
Bigelow & Pargetter, Morality, Potential Persons and Abortion, 25 AM. PHIL. Q. 173, 178 (1988);
Singer & Dawson, IVF Technology and the Argument from Potential, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 95-
96 (1988). The point at which the fetus develops interests may be drawn at viability because roughly
at this stage the fetus attains sufficient physiologic development to be sentient and thus have interests
in its own right. See Robertson, supra note 49.
51. The symbolic costs consist of that impact on the lives of actual persons, including the moral
tone or atmosphere of society, that results from the attitude toward potential persons symbolized by
the willingness to prevent their emergence into being after conception has occurred. The existence
and magnitude of those costs is, of course, a matter of debate and controversy.
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sought by abortion sufficiently outweighs the symbolic devaluation of life
that occurs when fetuses that cannot be harmed in their own right are
aborted. Many persons find that the burdens of unwanted pregnancy
outweigh the symbolic devaluation of fetal life. Others would require a
more compelling reason, such as protecting the mother's life or health,
avoiding the birth of a handicapped child, or avoiding the burdens of a
pregnancy due to rape or incest.
Compared to these reasons for abortion, terminating a pregnancy to
obtain tissue to save one's own life or the life of a close relative seems
equally, if not more, compelling. Indeed, aborting to obtain tissue would
seem as compelling as even the most stringent reasons for permitting
abortion, e.g., saving the mother's life or health, avoiding a handicapped
birth, or avoiding pregnancy due to rape or incest. And certainly if abor-
tion in the case of an unwanted pregnancy is deemed permissible, abor-
tion to obtain tissue to save another person's life is.
If tissue from the fetus is transplanted into the mother to save her own
life, the situation is very close to one in which abortion is justified to save
the mother's life or health.52 If the mother may abort to save her own
life, however, should she be disqualified from aborting to save the life of
another? To say "yes" would elevate narcissism over altruism. In short,
aborting an early fetus to get tissue to save oneself or one's close relative
seems as ethically sound a reason for aborting as other reasons that are
generally accepted. In fact, many persons would find this motive more
compelling than the desire to end an unwanted pregnancy.
Of course, aborting a wanted pregnancy to prevent severe neurologic
disease in oneself or a close relative would hardly be done joyfully, and
would place the mother in an excruciating dilemma, not unlike the situa-
tion in William Styron's Sophie's Choice. 3 In this case, a fetus that could
be carried to term would have to be sacrificed to save a parent, spouse,
52. The difference here is that the fetus itself is not threatening the mother's health, but is the
means by which the mother's life will be saved. Yet in each case the death of the fetus protects the
mother. If an innocent fetus can be sacrificed in one case, could it be sacrificed in another? If the
fetus had the moral status of a person, this distinction would be crucial if the mother were not
otherwise permitted to terminate the pregnancy. Supra note 49. Indeed, the fetus could not in that
case be sacrificed even to save many lives. Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395
(1985).
53. Styron presents the dilemma of the Nazis forcing a mother to select one of her children to
be murdered, or lose them both. If the early fetus does not itself have rights, the Sophie's Choice
analogy is inapt, since the choice in the fetal context is between a potential child and an actual child
or adult. However, the choice is still painful because the potential child would have become actual
but for the need to produce tissue for the person in need. (I am indebted to Judith Areen for this
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sibling or child who already exists. Such a tragic choice would engender
loss or grief in the mother, whatever the decision reached by her. Yet
one cannot say that the choice to abort is ethically impermissible, if early
abortion of unwanted pregnancies, or abortion for more compelling rea-
sons, is acceptable. In all such cases the fetus is being sacrificed or used
as a means to advance other goals. There is no sound basis for distin-
guishing use of fetal tissue for transplant, if sacrifice of the fetus to pursue
those other goals is permitted.
Public attitudes toward a woman aborting an otherwise-wanted preg-
nancy to benefit a family member most likely would reflect attitudes to-
ward abortion generally. 4 Those who are against abortion in all
circumstances will object to abortions done to treat severe neurologic dis-
ease in the mother or a family member. Similarly, persons who accept
family planning abortions should have no objection to abortion to pro-
cure tissue for transplant, because the fetal status is no more compelling
and the interest of the woman in controlling her body and reproductive
capacity is similar.
Since neither group forms a majority, however, persons who object to
family planning abortions but who accept abortions that are necessary to
protect the mother's health, in cases of rape or incest, or to prevent a
handicapped birth, will determine whether a majority of people approve
of abortions for transplant. It is conceivable that many persons in this
swing group would find abortion acceptable if performed to obtain tissue
for transplant into a family member. The benefit of alleviating severe
neurologic disease is arguably as great as the benefits in the cases they
accept as justifiable abortion." Indeed, they are likely to view abortion
for transplant purposes as more compelling than abortions done for fam-
ily planning purposes. If this group accepts abortion to procure tissue
for transplant to a family member, a clear majority in favor of the prac-
tice would exist. 6
analogy). For this reason the abortion may be more difficult than abortion of a pregnancy under-
taken to obtain tissue for transplant.
54. Public attitudes alone do not determine the ethical acceptability of a practice. They do,
however, show that the ethical analysis presented may be in keeping with the considered judgment of
many persons.
55. If they accept abortion to prevent serious harm to the mother, then they should approve an
abortion to procure tissue for transplant to the pregnant woman. But see supra note 49. If the fetus
may be sacrificed to save the mother, then abortion to procure comparable benefits to others should
also be permitted.
56. America's Abortion Dilemma, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 14, 1985, at 22.
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b. Conceiving and Aborting for Transplant Purposes
What then about the situation where the woman is not yet pregnant,
but seeks to conceive in order to abort and obtain tissue for transplant?
If histocompatibility between tissue source and recipient is needed, most
pregnancies would have to be deliberately planned for that purpose. If a
woman already pregnant may abort to obtain tissue for transplant, is
there an ethical objection to conceiving for that purpose and then
aborting?
In terms of fetal welfare, no greater harm occurs to the fetus conceived
in order to be aborted, as long as the abortion occurs at a stage at which
the fetus is insufficiently developed to experience harm, such as during
the first trimester." Of course, such deliberate creation may have greater
symbolic or moral significance, because it denotes a willingness to use
fetuses as a means to serve other ends. However, aborting when already
pregnant to procure tissue for transplant (or to save the mother's life,
prevent a handicapped birth, or avoid unwanted pregnancy) also denotes
a willingness to use the fetus as a means to other ends. Deliberate crea-
tion of fetuses to be aborted may enhance the perception that human life
is being systematically devalued, but reasonable persons could find that
the additional symbolic devaluation is negligible, or in any case, insuffi-
cient to outweigh the substantial gain to recipients that deliberate crea-
tion provides. As long as abortion of an existing pregnancy for
transplant purposes is ethically accepted, conceiving in order to abort
and procure tissue for transplant should also be ethically acceptable
when necessary to alleviate great suffering in others.58
57. The situation is thus distinguishable from one in which the entity created did develop inter-
ests before being sacrificed for the good of others. See also supra note 53.
58. Some insight into the symbolic concerns that arise when fetuses are created and then
aborted for transplant purposes may be gained by considering analogous situations with embryo
research, embryo farming and fetal reduction.
The ethics of embryo research generally accept research with excess embryos produced in the
attempt to achieve pregnancy through in vitro fertilization (IVF) for legitimate scientific purposes.
See Robertson, Embryo Research, 24 U.W. ONTARIO L. REv. 15, 35-36 (1986). Yet several national
ethics bodies have recommended and two Australian states have enacted legislation against conceiv-
ing embryos solely for research purposes, even though similar British and Canadian bodies have
approved it. Id. at 35-36.
Because embryo research is permitted if the embryos were by-products of IVF attempts at preg-
nancy, such research poses no greater harm to embryos when they are created solely for research
purposes. The opposition to creating embryos for research purposes is a symbolic, moral concern
that should be balanced against the need to obtain embryos in this way to conduct research. Given
that important research on egg freezing and the microinjection of sperm cannot be conducted other-
wise, there is a strong argument for permitting research on embryos created for that purpose. The
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
462 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 66:443
Many people will resist this conclusion, even if they accept abortion to
procure tissue when the woman is already pregnant. Whether rationally
or not, they assign moral or symbolic significance to the fact of deliberate
creation for abortion, and are less ready to sanction such a practice.
Others who accept abortion for tissue procurement when the woman is
already pregnant will find insufficient differences in deliberate creation to
outweigh the resulting good. Public acceptability of such a practice thus
situation is distinguishable, however, because unlike fetuses conceived and aborted to obtain tissue,
the preimplantation embryos in question have not developed even the rudiments of a neurologic
system or differentiated other organs.
A variation on this issue would arise if embryos produced by IVF could be grown in culture
outside of the body long enough to produce the tissue necessary for transplant. Since embryos can-
not develop in vitro for more than six to eight days, they are not now a source of tissue for transplant.
Suppose, however, that it became possible to culture embryos long enough for tissue farming pur-
poses. Because implantation in a woman does not occur, there is no pregnancy to be aborted. How-
ever, an early embryo would be created and destroyed in order to obtain tissue for transplant. If
obtained very early in development, the embryo would not have developed to the point at which it
itself had interests or rights, and thus would not be harmed by the practice. Yet symbolic concerns
with deliberately creating and destroying human life would still arise. The policy issue would be
whether the benefits from this tissue source outweighed the symbolic costs of creating and destroying
embryos to obtain tissue for transplant. See Robertson, Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty:
The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 985-86 (1986).
The growing practice of selective reduction of multiple fetuses resulting from the use of fertility
drugs or the transfer of several IVF-produced embryos also presents an issue of deliberately creating
fetuses that will be destroyed to serve other goals. Selective reduction or abortion of quintuplets or
quadruplets to twins can be justified by the benefits to the mother and to the surviving fetuses.
Selective reduction increases the chance of a full term delivery and healthy survival, rather than
premature birth and a high risk of death or serious handicap in all. Berkowitz, Selective Reduction
of Multifetal Pregnancies in the First Trimester, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1043 (1988).
The problem, however, is that the need for the selective reduction usually arises from the mother's
decision to take fertility drugs to achieve pregnancy, knowing that multifetal pregnancy and hence
need for selective reduction might arise. The mother's wish to reduce the number of fetuses seems
less ethically justified when the need results from her deliberate actions, rather than arises naturally.
Again, the ethical concern is symbolic-the deliberate devaluation of fetal life that occurs in the
willingness to risk creating fetuses that will then be aborted. Of course, the good of achieving preg-
nancy might be taken to outweigh the symbolic harm, particularly if the abortion is early in the first
trimester. See Holder & Henifin, Case Studies: Selective Termination of Pregnancy, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Feb.-March 1988, at 21 (1988).
Other instances of creating embryos or fetuses with the intention or high risk that they would be
destroyed arise with reports of "pregnancy doping" by eastern european female athletes and abortion
or embryo selection for sex determination purposes. In the first instance women are reported to have
become pregnant in order to raise hormone levels to enhance athletic performance, and then abort.
In the second, women abort to avoid the birth of a child of a gender that is undesired because of its
association with X linked genetic disease (usually male) or for social reasons (usually female). The
ethics of these practices depends upon the stage of development at which abortion occurs, the impor-
tance of the benefits derived, the risks to the women and the symbolic costs associated with inten-
tional destruction of prenatal life.
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depends on how the swing group views the fact of deliberate creation for
the purpose of abortion, assuming it would accept abortion to procure
tissue when the pregnancy is not planned for that purpose.
In sum, deliberate creation of fetuses to be aborted for tissue procure-
ment is more ethically complex and defensible than the widespread dis-
missal it has received would suggest.59 Such a practice is, of course, not
in itself desirable, but, in a specific situation of strong personal or familial
need, may be justified. Further ethical analysis of the situation should
await actual development of the need. In the meantime, the fear that
fetal tissue transplants will encourage women to abort to obtain tissue for
transplant should be more carefully scrutinized as the main concern driv-
ing policy. If the specific need arises, aborting to obtain tissue for a fam-
ily member may be more defensible than many previously thought.
III. ISSUES OF MATERNAL AUTONOMY AND WELFARE
While the controversy over fetal tissue transplants has centered on fe-
tal status, issues of maternal autonomy and welfare also deserve consid-
eration. Respecting the woman's decision to abort and to dispose of fetal
remains, however, may conflict with the need to protect women from
undue pressure and inducements to abort, to donate fetal tissue, or to
change the timing and method of abortion. Are limitations on the wo-
man's choice about abortion and disposition of fetal remains ethically
justified, or do they constitute unnecessary paternalism? The following
discussion considers these issues in the context of the mother's role in
disposing of fetal tissue, the process of obtaining consent, and changes in
the timing and method of abortion.
A. Maternal Disposition of Fetal Remains
Maternal autonomy over the decision to abort and to donate fetal tis-
sue is a central ethical concern once fetal tissue transplants are deemed
acceptable. Yet some ethicists would deny the woman authority to do-
nate fetal remains because she has chosen abortion, or because they fear
that dispositional authority will induce women to become pregnant and
abort in order to produce fetal tissue. This discussion considers each
argument separately.
59. Most commentators who recommend a ban on such abortions have not thoroughly ana-
lyzed the issue, perhaps because the need for such abortions has not yet arisen. Mahowald et al,
Transplantation of Neural Tissue from Fetuses, 235 SCIENCE 1308-09 (1987) (letter to editor).
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1. The Mother's Right to Dispose of Fetal Tissue
Federal research regulations and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
effective in every state, give the mother the right to make or withhold
donations of fetal remains for research or therapy.' ° Some ethicists, how-
ever, would deny women this right on the ground that the decision to
abort disqualifies her from playing any role in disposition of fetal re-
mains.61 This argument is mistaken on two grounds and would lead
either to procuring fetal tissue without parental consent or to a total ban
on fetal transplants.62
The major premise of this argument is that the person disposing of
cadaveric remains acts as a guardian or proxy for the deceased. Because
the mother has chosen to kill the fetus by abortion, she is no longer quali-
fled to act as the proxy or guardian of the fetus that she has abandoned.63
One mistake here is the assumption that the person who disposes of
cadaveric remains acts as a guardian or proxy for the deceased. De-
ceased persons or fetuses no longer have interests to be protected, as per-
sons with guardians or proxy decision-makers have. Rather, control of
human remains is assigned to next-of-kin because of their own interests
in making anatomical gifts and in assuring that the remains are treated
60. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr Acr § 3, 8A U.L.A. 8-9 (West Supp. 1987). The UAGA makes
the mother's consent determinative "unless the father objects." See also 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(d)
(1987). These provisions require that the father also consent to use of fetal tissue unless he is un-
available to consent.
61. Mahowald, Placing Wedges Along a Slippery Slope: Use of Fetal Neural Tissue for Trans-
plantation, 36 CLINICAL RESEARCH 220 (1988); Burtchaell, supra note 28, at 8. Presumably they
would disqualify the father who agreed to the abortion from consenting as well. Only where the
father opposed the abortion would he have a right to donate fetal tissue for transplant.
This argument might have some force in the case of a parent who kills a child or a spouse who
murders a spouse. Although determining burial or organ donation rights is usually not an incentive
to murder, perhaps the murderer should lose the right to determine organ donation and burial in
those cases, just as they lose the right to collect inheritance or life insurance. Riggs v. Palmer, 115
N.Y. 506, 513, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (1889). A woman who aborts is not committing murder, however.
She is doing a legal act, indeed, a legal act enshrined as a basic constitutional right.
62. The latter is the goal ofsome persons taking this position. Burtchaell, for example, uses the
claimed inappropriateness of the mother as disposer of fetal remains to argue that they should not be
used at all, because it would be "undignified" to use human remains without the consent of next-of-
kin. Burtchaell, supra note 28, at 8. This position is thus another way to challenge the ethical
acceptability of fetal tissue transplants.
63. In an analogous situation, a woman who aborts does not automatically lose custody of an
infant born alive as the result of an abortion procedure that attempted to kill the fetus. She is
entitled to both substantive and procedural due process before her parental prerogatives may be
terminated. See Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265, 1271 (7th Cir. 1986); Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193,
195 (7th Cir. 1979).
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respectfully by burial or cremation. It is not a right which they earn
because they have protected the kin's interest when alive. Nor is the
right assigned to them because they are best situated to implement the
deceased's prior wishes concerning disposition of his cadaver.' Indeed,
the latter concern is particularly inappropriate in the case of an aborted
fetus, which could have had no specific wishes concerning disposition of
its remains.
A second mistake is the assumption that a woman has no interest in
what happens to the fetus that she chooses to abort. As a product of her
body and potential heir that she has for her own reasons chosen not to
bring to term, she may care deeply about whether fetal remains are con-
tributed to research or therapy to help others. Given that interest, there
is good reason-and no compelling contrary reason-to respect her
wishes, as current law presently does.65 Indeed, in cases of conflict be-
tween the mother and the father over disposition, one could argue that
the mother's wishes should control because the fetus was removed from
her body.66
Thus, granting the woman who aborts the right to dispose of fetal re-
mains does not undermine or conflict with any of the purposes served in
giving next-of-kin dispositional control of human remains. There is not
good reason to override existing law and traditional practice in this area.
Alternative policies would pose even greater problems, requiring either
that fetal remains be used without parental consent or not at all. Neither
64. Some persons argue that the next-of-kin is to decide how the deceased would want to be
treated if able to tell us, or how they would have wanted to be treated if previously asked about it.
Caplan, Should Fetuses or Infants be Utilized as Organ Donors, I BIOETHiCS 135 (1987). There is
little evidence that this idea underlies the family's traditional right to decide 'on burial.
65. See supra note 60. The law treats the aborted fetus as the woman's property for the purpose
of disposition and anatomical gifts, just as other excised tissue is treated as property in this sense.
Although the fetus is genetically different than other removed body parts, its source in the woman's
body makes her claim to dispose of it a strong one. (Would not a kidney that had been transplanted
to a patient be that patient's if later removed?) Perhaps a more accurate description is that the
aborted fetus is the woman's "quasi-property," because her dispositional authority is not unlimited.
She may have no right to sell it or display it publicly. Even if she could not demand payment for
donation to research, she could still determine whether donation for research will occur. Cf. Moore
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. BO 21195, slip. op. (Cal. App. July 21, 1988).
66. Both the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and federal research regulations permit the father
to veto her decision to donate. See supra note 60. It is unclear why he should have this authority,
however, because donation for research will create no later obligations in him, as might occur if the
woman donated a frozen embryo to another couple without his consent and a child were born. If
conflicts of this sort arise, the right of the father to veto the mother's donation should be
reconsidered.
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alternative is acceptable. Public policy in the United States has vigor-
ously rejected routine salvage of body parts without family consent as a
way to increase the supply of organs for transplants.67 Even presumed
consent, which presumes the family's consent in the absence of actual
objection, has been largely rejected. 68 Depriving the mother (and father
who agrees to the abortion) of the power to veto fetal tissue transplants
would single out fetal tissue for transplant use without family consent.
Such a radical change in tissue procurement practice is not necessary to
satisfy the need for fetal tissue and would serve only to punish women
who abort.69
A proposed alternative to a policy of fetal tissue procurement without
maternal consent is to ban fetal tissue transplants altogether in order to
prevent the mother from donating fetal tissue. However, this solution
burns the house to roast the pig, in effect making tissue transplants from
aborted fetuses ethically unacceptable. As we have seen, however, a ban
on all fetal transplants, whether to discourage abortions or to symbolize
opposition to abortion, is not justified.70
In sum, the ethical case for denying dispositional control of fetal re-
mains to the woman who aborts is not persuasive. The woman cannot
require that fetal remains be used for transplant because no donor has the
right to require that intended donees accept the anatomical gift,71 but she
should retain the existing legal right to veto use of fetal remains for trans-
plant or other purposes. Her consent to donation of fetal tissue should be
routinely sought by those who retrieve fetal tissue.
67. Robertson, Supply and Distribution of Hearts for Transplantation. Legal, Ethical and Policy
Issues, 75 CIRCULATION 77, 79 (1987).
68. Only twelve states allow presumed consent for cornea donations. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, April, 1986, p. 30.
69. Such a result would not, however, violate any fundamental right to control disposition of
bodily parts. See infra note 125. Nor would it violate any moral right of the woman per se accord-
ing to ethicist Albert R. Jonsen, Jonsen, Transplantation of Fetal Tissue: An Ethicist's Viewpoint, 36
CLINICAL RESEARCH 215, 219 (1988).
70. See supra notes 20-46 and accompanying text. Indeed, there would also be serious constitu-
tional problems as well. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
71. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act permits the designated donee to reject the anatomical
gift. Indeed, persons who sign organ donor cards often have their gifts refused before they reach the
donee, because organ procurement agencies generally require more authorization to donate than a
signed organ donor card.
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2. Will Maternal Consent Encourage Abortion?
A second reason for denying women dispositional control of fetal re-
mains is the fear that it will lead them to become pregnant and abort in
order to obtain fetal tissue for transplant. As we have seen, there is little
reason now to think that women will abort to obtain tissue for transplant.
The possibility of donation will be a minor factor in the decision to abort,
and no need now exists to seek fetal tissue from sources other than abor-
tions performed to end unwanted pregnancy.
If the need to abort to produce fetal tissue did arise, however, the
mother's dispositional control over fetal remains would be essential. Un-
less she could donate fetal remains for transplant and designate the recip-
ient, it would be difficult to draw upon this source of fetal tissue.
Three arguments against a woman's voluntary use of her reproductive
capacity in this way can be made. The first argument, based on respect
for the welfare of the fetuses that are conceived only to be aborted, has
been discussed above, and found wanting in situations where a close fam-
ily member would be saved from death or serious loss of health.7"
A second argument, briefly treated here, is the need to protect women
from the physical burdens of a pregnancy and abortion they would not
otherwise undergo. Banning conception and abortion to procure fetal
tissue on paternalistic grounds cannot be reconciled with a woman's au-
tonomy. The physical and psychological burdens of an abortion are not
so substantial that women should for their own good be barred from
freely assuming them. If women are already pregnant, aborting will
probably be less physically hazardous and intrusive than going to term,
even though grief and psychological complexities doubtlessly may
occur.
7 3
If women conceive in order to abort, the physical and psychological
risks incurred by them may be reasonably viewed as equivalent to or less
than the risks associated with kidney or bone marrow donation, both of
which ordinarily entail greater physical intrusion.74 The benefits to the
72. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
73. Depending on the circumstances and previous experiences and psychological make-up of
the woman, the abortion might be experienced with at least the grief that accompanies a miscarriage,
which can be substantial. The feeling of loss here will by compounded by the notion that this was a
pregnancy that might have gone to term. On the other hand, the satisfaction at doing good for a
close relative could overcome or negate these feelings.
74. Although the physical intrusion may be less in abortions, the woman loses a fetus and
potential child, and not just renewable tissue or a functionally superfluous kidney. The psychologi-
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recipient are comparable in each case, and the sacrifice made by the do-
nor should be equally permitted-and applauded. In terms of maternal
welfare, there is no reason to treat pregnancy to procure tissue for trans-
plant differently than kidney and marrow donations."
A third argument is that women would thereby be viewed as "vessels"
or "machines" to produce fetal tissue, thus denigrating their inherent
worth as persons. The problem with this argument is that the same
charge can be made against any living donor, whether of kidney, bone
marrow, blood, sperm or egg. Insofar as persons donate body parts, they
may be viewed as mere tissue or organ producers, with their full reality
as persons obliterated by their tissue-producing role. Indeed, women
who bear children are always in danger of being viewed as child-breeders.
Such views oversimplify the complex emotional reality of organ and tis-
sue donation and of human reproduction. While perceptions of preg-
nancy and procreative capacity may eventually be affected, the danger
that fetal tissue donors would be so narrowly viewed would not justify
barring women from freely assuming that role to provide sick patients
needed tissue for transplant.7 6
Such donations, however, are ethically acceptable only because the
risks are freely chosen. To assure that consent is protected, special atten-
tion should be given to consent procedures that will protect the woman
from being coerced or unduly pressured by prospective donors and their
families, just as occurs with living related kidney and marrow donors.
Special consent procedures, including waiting periods, consent advisors
and monitors, and other devices to guarantee free, informed consent are
cal impact will accordingly be greater, since loss of a fetus cannot be equated with loss of a kidney or
bone marrow.
75. This is true even if the donor is unrelated to the recipient and is recruited solely for that
purpose, because unrelated bone marrow and even kidney donations do occur. Paying the donor to
conceive and abort does not change the balance of risks, even though it may induce certain women to
volunteer for this procedure. A ban on such donations would deny recipients a great benefit, a factor
that should be considered in deciding whether to interfere on paternalistic grounds with the autono-
mous choice of the woman. In any event, the donor's decisional process should be closely monitored
to assure that it is free and informed.
76. This argument assumes that no money will be paid for her donation. See infra notes 91-102
and accompanying text. Even so, the practice of using one's reproductive capacity to produce tissue
for transplant may alter or at least complicate perceptions of female reproductive function. Indeed,
it would be surprising if some such effect did not occur. That does not mean, however, that women
would be so depersonalized that they should be deprived of these choices over their bodies, and
needy recipients deprived of transplants.
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clearly justified, even though a total ban on such donations is not.7 7
B. The Process of Obtaining Consent
If the woman retains the right to determine whether fetal tissue is used
for research or therapy, tissue procurement procedures should respect
that right. The main ethical concern then is to assure that her choice
about tissue donation and the abortion is free and informed.
To that end, current federal regulations require, and many commenta-
tors recommend, that consent to tissue donation be clearly separated
from consent to the abortion. A clear separation of the two decisions will
assure that tissue donation is not a prerequisite to performance of the
abortion. 8 Also, it will prevent the prospect of donating fetal remains
from influencing the decision to abort.7 9
At present, the recommended procedure is to have the request to do-
nate fetal tissue made only after the woman has consented to the abor-
tion. The alternative of waiting until the abortion has been performed
may not be practical." In addition, the person requesting consent to
tissue donation and performing the abortion should not be the person
using the donated tissue in research or therapy. This constraint is widely
followed in cadaveric organ procurement.
While these procedures are, on the whole, sound, two problems should
be noted. Withholding information about fetal tissue donation until after
consent to abort is obtained may deprive women of information that is
material to their decision to abort, thus preventing their decision from
being fully informed. However, only a small group of women would be
materially affected by this constraint. Information about tissue donation
will not be material to women who choose to abort without that knowl-
edge, since their decision is not affected by the possibility of donation. In
77. See Robertson, Taking Consent Seriously: IRB Intervention in the Consent Process, IRB A
REVIEW' OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, May 1982, at 1.
78. Cases might rarely arise in which a physician would not do the abortion unless it were
specifically for transplant purposes. This, however, will not be the case with tissue retrieved from
family planning abortions.
79. A clear separation of the abortion and donation decisions would prevent the prospect of
donating fetal remains from influencing the decision to abort except to the extent that publicity
about fetal transplants will make women generally aware of the prospect of donation.
80. The woman's capacity to consent after the abortion may be diminished due to anesthesia or
the emotional effects of the abortion itself, and the time that viable fetal tissue may be retrieved is
short.
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any event, they will be informed of donation options after they decide to
abort.
The group most affected by this policy are women who decide against
abortion after discussing the matter with a physician or abortion facility,
but who would have chosen to abort if they had been informed that they
might donate fetal tissue for transplant. This group would probably not
be large. Further, women who are so ambivalent about abortion that
tissue donation would reverse a decision against abortion could be re-
quired to raise the issue themselves.81 Given the small size of the group
and the benefits of clearly separating the abortion and donation decision
in family planning abortions, the policy is defensible. 2
A second potential problem is that separating the person requesting
the tissue donation from the person performing the tissue transplant
might not effectively guard the woman from pressure to donate. This
practice would not prevent the person who obtains consent for the abor-
tion from also requesting the tissue donation, albeit at a later point in
time. If the same person requests both, particularly if it is the physician
performing the abortion, and the abortion facility has a financial interest
in maximizing tissue procurement, the risk of undue pressure or manipu-
lation of the woman to donate might occur. Since abortion facilities will
not be able to sell fetal tissue,83 this danger may be minimal. To reduce
81. At that point, the person obtaining consent could inform them of that possibility or even
refuse to discuss it until after the decision to abort is made. But if such knowledge is generally in the
air, the ambivalent woman may take it into account or condition her acceptance of the abortion on
use of the remains in research or therapy.
Informing women of the chance to donate if they are ambivalent is not, however, an "inducement
... offered to terminate [the] pregnancy.. ." that is prohibited by the federal regulations. 45 C.F.R,
§ 46.206(b) (1987). Even if the information is given before consent to the abortion, it is not an
inducement unless offered specifically for the purpose of "inducing" the woman to terminate the
pregnancy and donate the tissue. It would simply be informing the woman of her option to donate
fetal tissue.
82. If women undecided or ambivalent about abortion do raise the question, the physician
should inform them of fetal tissue donation options. Providing such information should not be
considered an illegal inducement to abortion, even if it has the effect of leading women to choose
abortion when absent the information they would not have done so, because no valuable considera.
tion to abort is offered. See National Institutes of Health, Report of the Panel on Fetal Tissue
Transplantation Research, (forthcoming). When the woman does not inquire and thus is not in-
formed of donation options, however, it is unclear whether legal doctrines of informed consent have
been violated. Only women who would have aborted if so informed, but who choose not to because
ignorant of that possibility, could make such a claim.
83. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. Although abortion facilities cannot sell fetal
tissue, they can recoup the expenses of procuring the tissue. Loose accounting of reimbursable costs
could make it financially advantageous to them to retrieve as much tissue as possible. A payment of
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such influences, perhaps the person who obtains consent to the abortion
should not also request the tissue donation.
C. Changes in Timing and Method of Abortion
Federal regulations (and most commentators) state that "no proce-
dural changes which may cause greater than minimal risk to the fetus or
pregnant woman will be introduced into the procedure for terminating
the pregnancy solely in the interest" of the research activity. 4 Although
this policy is partially intended to protect fetuses from later or more
painful abortions," a main concern is to protect women from postponing
pregnancy or undergoing more onerous abortion procedures than they
otherwise would, solely to obtain tissue for transplant. Once again, a
potential conflict arises between maternal autonomy and paternalism.
Some changes in abortion procedures to enhance tissue procurement
pose little additional risk to the woman and should be permitted. For
example, reductions in the amount of suction, use of a larger bore needle,
and ultrasound-guided placement of the suction instrument in evacuation
abortions might facilitate the retrieval of tissue and organs from first tri-
mester aborted fetuses by increasing the chance that tissue will be re-
moved whole and unmacerated.86
More problematic would be changes in abortion methods that increase
the risks and burdens of the abortion. Such methods include substitution
of prostaglandin induction or hysterotomy87 for less risky methods, or
postponement of an early first trimester abortion to later in the first tri-
mester, or to the second trimester. Apart from her desire to facilitate
$25-$50 per fetal pancreas retrieved may be financially attractive to abortion facilities and lead them
to seek donations and cut corners in the consent process. Strict rules about what counts as reimburs-
able procurement costs may be necessary to prevent profiteering in this way.
84. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(3)-(4) (1987).
85. This would be a concern later in the second trimester when the nervous system is so devel-
oped that the aborted fetus experiences pain. Also, delaying abortion might be viewed as using the
fetus as a means that symbolically devalues human life. See supra note 51. If abortion at the later
time is otherwise ethically acceptable, the issue is similar to the problem of creating embryos or
fetuses solely for research or tissue procurement purposes. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying
text.
86. Statement of Dr. George Allen, supra note 5. The use of ultrasound might involve some
increased cost, which all persons undergoing abortion would then pay. However, this change could
be independently justified as in the patients' interest to protect against perforations and should be
routinely done even though it is not now the practice.
87. A hysterotomy is a surgical incision into a uterus to remove a fetus, or abortion by Caesa-
rean section.
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tissue donation, these changes would appear to be against the woman's
interest.
Can such paternalistic interference with the mother's choice be justi-
fied? While a libertarian might disagree, asking the woman to take on
these extra burdens can be ethically justified only if they were necessary
to obtain viable tissue. If sufficient tissue can be obtained without such
changes, then it would not be ethically sound to ask a patient to assume
extra burdens, even the burdens of slightly delaying the abortion."8 Suffi-
cient fetal tissue for research and therapy may now be obtained without
changes in individual abortion procedures, therefore, the federal rules
against such changes remain sound.
A different policy should be considered if changes in timing or method
of abortion become necessary to procure viable tissue for transplant. If
the need were clearly shown, there is no objection in principle to asking a
woman to assume some additional burdens for the sake of tissue procure-
ment. If the woman is already pregnant and determined to have an abor-
tion, the additional risks of postponing the abortion a few weeks, or even
changing to a prostaglandin abortion, would seem well within the range
of risks that persons may voluntarily choose to benefit others.8 9 Indeed,
the risks would seem no different than those that a woman who conceives
for transplant purposes assumes, or the risks that a kidney or marrow
donor takes on. Special IRB review9" and other consent procedures to
protect the woman's autonomy, however, would be in order.
IV. COMMERCIALIZATION OF FETAL TISSUE
In addition to ethical concerns about fetal and maternal welfare, oppo-
nents of fetal tissue transplants have raised the specter that fetal tissue
procurement will lead to a commercial market in abortions and in fetal
tissue. Paying money to women to abort, or to donate once they abort, is
generally perceived as damaging to human dignity. Commercial buying
88. This is a basic principle of medical ethics, evident in research rules, which do not permit a
subject to accept freely all risks, but only those risks that have a reasonable chance of procuring
useful knowledge. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 l(a)(2) (1987). Further, the risks to the subject must be so
outweighed by the sum of the benefit to the subject and the importance of the knowledge to be
gained, as to warrant a decision to allow the subject to accept those risks.
89. Abortion by hysterotomy raises a more difficult issue, because it is major surgery no longer
used to terminate pregnancy. It would be a rare case, however, in which a hysterotomy would be
necessary to obtain viable tissue for transplant.
90. IRB refers to Institutional Review Boards, established by Congress to oversee federally-
funded scientific research. See 46 C.F.R. § 101-409 (1987).
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and selling of fetal tissue raises similar concerns. Such market transac-
tions risk exploiting women and their reproductive capacity, and deni-
grating the human dignity of aborted fetuses by treating them as market
commodities.91
Most commentators and advisory bodies that have considered fetal tis-
sue transplants recommend that market transactions in abortions and fe-
tal tissue be prohibited.92 The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984,
which bans the payment of "valuable consideration" for the donation or
distribution of solid organs, was amended in 1988 to ban sales of fetal
organs and "any subparts thereof. " In addition, several states prohibit
the sale of fetal tissue and organs.94
At present such policies are easily supported, for they would appear to
91. For opposition to markets in body products generally, see R. TrrMUss, THE GIFr RELA-
TIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1972); Radin, Market Inalienability, 100
HARv. L. REv. 1849 (1987); Murray, Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., April 1987, at 30-35 (1987).
92. See supra note 61.
93. The National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS (98 Stat) 2339 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. 111984)). This law originally did not
list the brain as an organ covered by the Act, though the liver and pancreas were listed. Arguably,
pancreatic islet cells and fetal liver tissue were covered, even if fetal brain cells were not, on the
theory that such cells and tissue were a subpart of the covered organ, and that Congress could not
have intended only to ban the sale of the full organ and not subparts such as tissue and cells. Con-
gress amended the Act in 1988 by changing the definition of "human organ" to mean "the human
(including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone and skin or any
subpart thereof and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a
fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation." CONG. REC.
H10214, Oct. 13, 1988. Fetal cells and tissue of the named organs as subparts are now more clearly
covered. Presumably the brain, as an organ, could be added to the list by the Secretary. Fetal neural
tissue of interest to Parkinson's disease patients would then be covered as a subpart of the brain.
However, payment for fetal brain tissue would not be banned until the Secretary issued the necessary
regulation.
Assuming that fetal tissue is covered as a "subpart" of the named organs, a major issue that arises
under the act will be whether firms that obtain, process and distribute fetal tissue for transplant may
be able to "sell" the processed tissue to doctors and patients and receive profit in addition to their
processing costs. If the act does not permit profit as part of the "reasonable payments" for process-
ing tissue, it could have a negative effect on future developments in this field. For further discussion
of this point, see infra notes 101-106, 156 and accompanying text.
94. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-439 (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (West Supp. 1987);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81.54(7) (Smith-Hurd 1983); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9:122 (Supp.
1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 1593
(1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2690 (West 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West
Supp. 1986); Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.036 (1988); NEv. REv. STAT. § 451.015 (1985); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.2-02 (1981); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63,
§ 1-735 (1987); PA. CONS. STAT. § 3216 (Purdon 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(f) (Supp. 1987);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4-208 (Supp. 1987); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 42.10,48.02 (Vernon 1974
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have little impact on the supply of fetal tissue for research and therapy.
Given the general willingness of Americans to donate blood, organs and
other tissue, there is little reason to think that women who abort un-
wanted pregnancies would not donate fetal tissue altruistically. 95 Indeed,
many women who abort are likely to donate fetal remains in the hope
that some additional good might result from the abortion.96 Paying them
to donate-buying their aborted fetuses-is thus unnecessary.
Nor at present is there any need to hire women to conceive and abort
to provide tissue for transplant. As noted previously, the million plus
annual abortions for family planning reasons is more than adequate to
supply fetal tissue needs for the near future. Even if histocompatibility
between the fetal tissue and recipient became essential, relatives rather
than paid recruits would be the prime candidates for pregnancies and
abortions to produce fetal tissue.97
But what if altruistic donations did not produce a sufficient supply of
fetal tissue for transplant, or the need for histocompatible tissue required
hiring women to be impregnated to produce a sufficient supply of fetal
tissue? Would such payments be unethical? Should current legal policy
still be maintained? Answering those questions would require balancing
the risks of exploitation and the symbolic costs of perceived commodifi-
cation (i.e. making fetuses subject to market transfer) against the need to
increase tissue supply to benefit needy patients and the rights of women
to determine use of their reproductive function.
No doubt many people would object to hiring women to conceive and
abort, and insist on maintaining current laws. However, if pregnancy
and abortion to produce fetal tissue is ethically defensible, then money
payments in some circumstances may also be defensible, given obliga-
tions of beneficence and respect for persons, the lack of alternative tissue
sources, and social practices in which some tissue donors are paid.98
and Supp. 1988); WYo. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1986). See also Note, Regulating the Sale ofHuman
Organs, 71 VA. L. REv. 1015 (1985).
95. Physicians testified at the NIH Panel on Fetal Tissue Transplant Research that over 90% of
women who were asked to donate fetal tissue agreed, a rate that compares favorably with the 70%
rate of cadaveric organ donation from families of brain dead persons. See Task Force Report, supra
68, at 28.
96. It does not follow, however, that the donation is the determinative factor in deciding to
abort, even if women who donate feel better about their decision to abort.
97. However, some unrelated women would be recruited for this purpose, since many patients
might not have a relative available who is willing to conceive and abort to provide them with fetal
tissue. One can imagine the creation of agency or brokerage services to provide this service for a fee.
98. For example, sperm donors are generally paid, and the emerging custom with egg donation
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Legal policy might then be reconsidered to permit payments when essen-
tial to save the life or protect the health of transplant recipients who have
no other alternatives.99 Resolution of this difficult issue, however, should
await the actual occurrence of the need to pay to obtain fetal tissue for
transplant.
Current bans on buying and selling fetal tissue do not-and should
not-prohibit reasonable payments to recover the costs of retrieving fetal
tissue. Although paying organ donors is illegal under federal law, the
law and ethics of organ procurement allow for payment of costs incurred
in the acquisition of organs. 1°° Organ donor families, for example, are
not asked to pay for the costs of maintaining brain dead cadavers or for
surgically removing the organs that they donate. The same principle
should apply to fetal tissue donations. 1' Two related issues concern
paying the donor's abortion expenses and paying other tissue retrieval
costs.
A. Paying Abortion Expenses
Paying the cost of the abortion should be ethically and legally accepta-
ble only in those instances in which the abortion is performed solely to
obtain tissue for transplant. In that case, paying for the abortion is not a
fee to donate tissue, but rather is payment of the costs of acquiring the
donated tissue, comparable to paying the cost of the nephrectomy that
makes a kidney donation possible. Other out-of-pocket costs incurred by
the donor could also be reimbursed without violating federal law or ethi-
cal constraints.
In contrast, when the abortion is performed for reasons unrelated to
is to pay women up to $1200 to undergo ovarian stimulation and surgical removal of eggs under
general anesthesia. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in Human
Egg Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. (1988) (forthcoming).
99. In fact, the laws prohibiting hiring women to conceive and abort might unconstitutionally
violate a patient's right to effective medical care. See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. 11 1984). However, state organ sale laws are not always consistent
in allowing recovery of the reasonable expenses of organ procurement. See supra note 94, at 1031-
32. Also, state laws against sale of aborted fetuses might not distinguish payments for the expenses
of the abortion from sale of the aborted fetus.
Note also that while most states ban baby selling, they do permit the payment of medical expenses
associated with the birth of the baby that is then adopted. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West
Supp. 1988).
101. Paying expenses may not violate state and federal laws against selling organs and tissue, but
it is unclear whether they would constitute an "inducement" within the federal research regulations.
See supra note 8 1.
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tissue procurement, paying abortion expenses amounts to paying the wo-
men to donate the tissue. This payment would constitute a sale of fetal
tissue and should not be tolerated as long as fetal tissue sales are prohib-
ited. 102 In any event, the willingness of most women to donate without a
fee should make payment of abortion expenses unnecessary.
B. Retrieval Costs and Tissue Retrieval and Processing Agencies
Because physicians who will use fetal tissue clinically ordinarily will
not perform the abortion that provides the tissue, a system of specialized
agencies that acquire fetal tissue from abortion clinics and distribute it
for research or clinical use is likely to develop. These agencies may re-
move the relevant tissue from the aborted fetus and process it in certain
ways to prepare it for therapeutic use, including propagating a line of
cells from smaller tissue samples. Such agencies may be nonprofit or for-
profit.
What role will money payments play in the operation of retrieval and
processing agencies? Under existing law the agencies will be unable to
pay women to donate fetal tissue. However, they should be free to pay
the costs of personnel directly involved in retrieval, whether employees of
the procurement agency or of the facility performing the abortion. For
example, a tissue retrieval agency may reimburse the abortion clinic for
using its space and staff to obtain consent for tissue donations and to
retrieve tissue from aborted fetuses.' 03 However, the abortion facility
could not charge the agency a fee beyond reasonable expenses incurred in
retrieving fetal tissue at their facility."'
In distributing fetal tissue to researchers and physicians, retrieval
agencies should, of course, be able to recoup the expenses of procuring
the tissue, including overhead and other operating expenses of the agency
itself. Such payment is consistent with organ transplant recipients (or
their payors) paying for the costs of organ procurement, including over-
head and other operating costs of the organ procurement agency
involved.
102. This is an example of how workable lines can be drawn that can minimize commercializa-
tion without preventing tissue procurement. See infra notes 104-06.
103. Statement of Fred Voss, Vice-President, Hana Biologies, Inc., NIH Panel on Fetal Tissue
Transplantation Research (Sept. 21, 1988).
104. It will be important to develop clear lines here so that abortion facilities do not sell fetal
tissue and thus offer inducements to persuade undecided women to donate or even to abort. Some
dilemmas may arise in implementing such rules. Liberal reimbursement rules for the facility's re-
trieval costs, for example, could enable them to offer abortions to poorer women at reduced rates.
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If the firm processing tissue is a for-profit enterprise, some profit mar-
gin should also be recognized in the amount it charges the recipient of
the tissue. While some persons might argue that recognizing any profit
amounts to a sale of fetal tissue that risks treating fetal tissue as a market
commodity, a clear distinction can be drawn between buying and selling
fetal tissue, and reimbursing for-profit tissue processing agencies for their
costs of providing tissue, including the cost of inducing capital invest-
ment in the firm. 105 Persons who organize resources and invest capital to
provide viable fetal tissue for transplant are performing a useful social
activity. Fears about treating donors and fetuses as commodities might
justify policies against selling fetal tissue, but they should not prevent
giving for-profit firms the incentives necessary to organize and provide
the services in question. 6
V. LEGAL BARRIERS TO FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTS
Our examination of the ethical issues shows that transplants of tissue
from aborted fetuses may ethically occur in many circumstances. Never-
theless, some legal barriers to research and therapeutic use of tissue from
aborted fetuses exist. The analysis first addresses state bans on research
and therapeutic use of aborted fetuses, and then considers the constitu-
tionality of such restrictions.
A. State Bans on Research With Aborted Fetuses
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act specifically permits use of tissue
from aborted fetuses for research, education and transplantation. 107 Yet
eight states have enacted statutes that prohibit research with aborted fe-
tuses, and proposals for similar laws in other states can be expected 08
105. While lines here might get blurry, this would seem no more objectionable than paying Fed-
eral Express to ship tissue, which payment would include some "profit" or return on capital to
Federal Express. Furthermore, it would seem no more objectionable than the "selling" of organ
transplants, medical services, drugs and hospital space in which for-profit entities throughout the
health care system engage.
106. The concerns really center on symbolic perceptions from allowing for-profit firms to operate
in this area. But the physicians who transplant the tissue, the overnight agency that ships it, the
hospital in which the transplant occurs, etc. all are making a profit. There is no good reason why the
firm processing the tissue should not profit as well, especially if no other entity would provide the
service. The wisdom and constitutionality of laws banning all "commercialization" of fetal tissue
may thus be questioned. See infra note 155.
107. National Conference of Commissioner on Uniform State Laws, UNIFORM ANATOMICAL
GIFT ACT (UAGA), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1987).
108. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-438 (Supp. 1985); ILL.
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State laws that make it a crime to acquire or use tissue from aborted
fetuses for research or therapy could have a major impact on further
development of and access to fetal tissue transplant therapies. The scope
of existing laws and their constitutionality thus deserve attention.
The eight states that now ban research with aborted fetuses enacted
those laws as part of an effort after Roe v. Wade to restrict abortion and
limit fetal experimentation. 0 9 Because legislative history is sparse and
these provisions were usually part of a comprehensive regulation of abor-
tion and fetal experimentation, it is difficult to ascertain the precise pur-
pose of each state law. One surmises that a main purpose was to remove
an incentive for abortion, even though there was little evidence of women
aborting solely for research purposes.110 No doubt a second purpose was
to make a symbolic statement about the perceived immorality of abor-
tion, by preventing any legitimating benefit from use of aborted fetuses.
Legislators may also have been concerned with protecting fetuses that
had been or were going to be aborted from the harm of
experimentation. I I 
The extent to which these statutes prohibit use of fetal tissue from
induced abortions depends, of course, on their precise wording.It 2 None
of them draw a distinction between research on fetuses aborted to get
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-54(7) (Smith-Hurd 1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (West 1986);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.13 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-3, 24-9A-4, 24-9A-5
(1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-735 (Supp.
1981).
Missouri has enacted a law that prohibits physicians from performing, and persons from utilizing,
fetal tissue or organs for "medical transplantation," if they know that the woman procured the
abortion to obtain tissue or organs for transplant to herself or another. H.B. No. 1479, 84th Gen.
Ass., 2d Reg. Sess. (1988) (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.036). Because this statute does
not apply to "medical transplantation" of fetal tissue or organs from abortions that occur for reasons
other than tissue procurement, it will not prevent research or therapeutic transplants with fetal tissue
from family planning abortions. The constitutional validity of such a ban is considered infra notes
140-56.
109. Baron, Legislative Regulation of Fetal Experimentation, printed in GENETICS AND THE
LAW III, 431-35, (Milunsky & Annas ed. 1985).
110. Id. Terry, "Alas! Poor Yorick," I Knew Him Ex Utero: The Regulation of Embryo and
Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the United States, 39 VAND. L. REV. 420 (1986).
111. See Baron, supra note 109; Fletcher and Ryan, Federal Regulations for Fetal Research: A
Case for Reform, 15 LAW, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE, 126-28 (Fall 1987). While fetuses that
were to be aborted or that had emerged alive from the abortion could be harmed by experimentation,
it is difficult to see how fetuses that were dead due to an induced abortion could be harmed by
experimentation. For example, proper respect for the dead does not preclude research, education
and transplantation use of cadavers.
112. In some cases these statutes may prevent research with spontaneously aborted fetuses as
well.
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tissue for experimentation and those aborted for family planning pur-
poses."' In addition, six of the eight states only prohibit "experimenta-
tion" with aborted fetuses.' 1 4 Thus, tissue from aborted fetuses could be
used for therapeutic, but not experimental, purposes in those states." 5
Moreover, all research uses of fetal tissue from induced abortions are
not necessarily banned. Oklahoma, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, and Illi-
nois make criminal the act of "experimenting upon the remains of a child
or an unborn child resulting from an abortion."116 But experimental use
of fetal tissue is not necessarily research "upon" that tissue. For exam-
ple, a research project that transplants fetal brain tissue into persons with
Parkinson's disease is an experiment upon the recipient of the transplant,
and not upon "the remains of a child or unborn child." Because criminal
statutes are to be strictly construed, such a reading is cogent and tenable
in those five states.
Statutes in Arizona, New Mexico and Arkansas are more broadly
worded, and would exclude experimental transplants that clearly have
the recipient as the experimental subject. The Arizona law states that
"no person shall knowingly use any human fetus or embryo, living or
dead, or any parts, organs, or fluids of such fetus resulting from an in-
duced abortion for any medical experimentation or scientific or medical
investigation.""' 7 Similarly, the New Mexico law prohibits clinical re-
search activity "involving" a fetus."II These laws would prohibit experi-
mental transplants (but not nonexperimental therapy) in the respective
states, but it would not prohibit the procurement of fetal tissue in those
states for experimental or other use in other states." 9
The Arkansas law is the most broadly worded. It states that no person
"shall possess either a fetus born dead as a result of a legal abortion, or
any organ, member, or tissue of fetal material resulting from a legal abor-
tion. '  Under this wording, no fetal tissue or organs could be "pos-
113. An exception is the recently enacted Missouri statute. See supra note 108.
114. Arkansas is the exception because of its ban on "possession" of the organ, tissue or material
of an aborted fetus. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-438 (Supp. 1985).
115. However, under the laws as now written, the research could be done in a state where it is
legal, and therapy based on that research could be provided in states which now ban
experimentation.
116. See, e.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Anderson 1985).
117. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (1986).
118. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-3, 24-9A-5 (1986).
119. However, Indiana would prohibit use of such tissue procured out of state as well. IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (West 1986).
120. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-438 (Supp. 1985).
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sessed" in Arkansas for any reason, whether medical or educational,
research or therapeutic, and whether or not procured in Arkansas. Pre-
sumably possession would include the possession of fetal tissue for the
period of time from when it is obtained until after it is transplanted, thus
placing the persons performing and receiving the tissue transplant in vio-
lation of the statute.121
B. Constitutionality of State Bans on Research with Aborted Fetuses
Existing state bans on research with aborted fetuses are vulnerable to
attack under the United States Constitution on several grounds, includ-
ing lack of a rational basis, vagueness, overbreadth and substantive due
process interference with fundamental rights of pregnant women, and
perhaps even of transplant recipients. In the only legal challenge to date,
a federal district court struck down the Louisiana law on the grounds
that it served no rational purpose, interfered with the right to have an
abortion, and was vague. 122 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court on the ground of vagueness only, finding that the defini-
tion of "experimentation" was too imprecise to give adequate notice
about which medical uses of aborted fetuses were permitted and which
were not. 123 The court thus left open the question of whether a better
drafted statute would withstand substantive attack. 124
In assessing the substantive arguments against bans on use of fetal tis-
sue, it is useful to distinguish between bans on use of tissue procured
from abortions performed for family planning reasons and abortions per-
formed solely to obtain fetal tissue. Since existing laws do not make this
distinction, they are vulnerable to arguments under either rubric.
L Bans on Use of Fetal Tissue From Family Planning Abortions
Laws banning research or other use of fetal tissue from abortions per-
formed to avoid pregnancy would strike at the heart of fetal tissue re-
search, and make further progress in this field exceedingly difficult. By
121. The recipient would "possess" the fetal tissue as well because it would be in his body at all
times, and as a result of a choice on his part, assuming he knew the source.
122. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 597 F. Supp. 636 (1984), aff'd, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).
123. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986). A concurring judge was willing to
find the Louisiana statute invalid on grounds other than vagueness. Id. at 999-1004 (Williams, J.,
specially concurring). See also Note, State Prohibition of Fetal Experimentation and the Fundamen-
tal Right of Privacy, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1073 (1988).
124. In theory, a statute void for vagueness can always be redrafted to overcome the vagueness
problem.
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banning all experimental use of fetuses from induced abortion, eight
states have such laws at the present time, and more may be in the offing.
Even if problems of vagueness are overcome, such laws could be attacked
as lacking a rational basis, interfering with the woman's right to abort
and infringing the recipient's right to receive health care.'25
a. Is There a Rational Basis?
Banning experimental or therapeutic fetal tissue from abortions occur-
ring for family planning reasons might not even satisfy the minimal ra-
tional basis test for legislation under either a due process or equal
protection rubric.
Opponents of such laws would argue that they violate basic due pro-
cess because no rational purpose is served in banning research (or thera-
peutic) uses of aborted fetuses.126 The abortions have been performed to
end unwanted pregnancy, and not to procure tissue for transplant. A
ban on research will not protect the fetus, which is dead and no longer
has interests to be protected. Nor is a ban necessary to show respect for
human life, since research or therapeutic use of human cadavers has long
been consistent with proper respect.
Such laws may also be effectively challenged as lacking a rational basis
on equal protection grounds.127  Several current statutes permit thera-
peutic but not experimental use of aborted fetuses. In addition, none of
125. See infra note 126. Such laws are not subject to attack on the basis of a fundamental right
to dispose of tissue independent of the abortion decision. As Commonwealth v. Edelin, 371 Mass.
497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976), makes clear, the right to abort does not necessarily give the woman the
right to control disposition of the aborted fetus. If the aborted fetus is alive she may have a legal
duty to treat it, despite her wishes to the contrary. Nor is there a fundamental right in the next-of-
kin to control disposition of cadaveric or fetal remains. Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hospital, 138
Mich. App. 683, 360 N.W.2d 275 (1984); State v. Powell, 11 Fla. 557, 497 So. 2d 1188 (1986), cert
denied, 107 S. Ct. 2202 (1987). Thus, laws prohibiting or mandating anatomical gifts would not
violate a fundamental right to dispose of cadaveric remains from oneself or others.
126. If the interest protected is not fundamental, due process requires that the legislation be
rationally related to a valid state purpose. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, in Roe v. Wade the
Supreme Court majority held that a woman's interest in making the decision to abort is protected as
a fundamental right. Id. at 152-53. Therefore, a state statute interfering with this right would be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires that the state interest be compelling and
the state's means be narrowly drawn to protect only the compelling state interest. Id. at 155.
127. Even if the interest protected were not fundamental, and thus not judged under a strict
"compelling interest" test, the legislation must still be "rationally related to a legitimate government
interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). If the purpose of the
law was to demonstrate the human worth of the fetus, it would be irrational to ban research on
aborted fetuses while permitting therapeutic uses of aborted fetuses.
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the eight states forbid the experimental use of other human remains, such
as victims of accident or violent crime. Thus, one could argue that these
distinctions are irrational, because no valid purpose is served by singling
out aborted fetuses for an experimental ban while permitting therapeutic
uses of aborted fetuses and permitting both experimental and therapeutic
uses of other human remains.
128
Proponents, on the other hand, would argue that such laws are ration-
ally related to discouraging abortion, because it will prevent women un-
decided about abortion from deciding to abort on the basis of tissue
donation. Also, such laws serve the purpose of announcing the state's
strong respect for prenatal life, even if that life has been taken, by re-
minding us that prenatal life is not to be exploited for the good of
others. 129 Further, restricting experimental but not therapeutic use of
aborted fetuses is justified as rational at a time when no therapeutic uses
have been clearly established and the full costs of a broader ban are not
clear. Nor, given the special need to protect fetuses subject to abortion,
is it irrational to ban experiments on aborted fetuses but not other human
cadavers. Finally, this ban might discourage doctors from persuading
women to abort to obtain fetuses for research.
While the rational basis test is notoriously easy to meet, courts may
well find (as did the district court and one judge at the appellate level in
Margaret S. v. Edwards)"'° that such broad restrictions, particularly
when therapeutic use of aborted fetuses and other human cadavers is
permitted, serve no rational purpose. Resolution of the issue may well
depend on whether judges considering such a challenge perceive such a
broad ban as serving a state goal of protecting prenatal life in any mean-
ingful way. Arguably, it does not.
b. Interference with the Right to Abort
If courts found such bans rational, the laws would still have to satisfy a
stricter standard of scrutiny if they interfered with or significantly bur-
dened the woman's decision to abort.131 Because these laws do not pre-
128. See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986) (argument that statute unconsti-
tutional under rational basis test) (J. Williams, concurring); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 597 F. Supp.
636 (1985) (invalidated statute under rational basis test).
129. The state may take steps to protect prenatal life as long as it does not impinge on fundamen-
tal rights in doing so. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
130. See supra notes 122-23.
131. See supra note 126.
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vent abortions sought solely for family planning purposes, but only
restrict disposition of fetal remains, it may be hard to show an interfer-
ence with reproductive decisionmaking.
One ground for finding such interference would be that a ban on re-
search impinges on the woman's future reproductive decisionmaking, by
preventing her from obtaining information directly relevant to her future
decisions about pregnancy and childbearing. 132 Research on topics unre-
lated to reproduction, however, such as Parkinson's disease or diabetes,
would not fall into that category. 133 A more narrowly drawn statute
could meet that objection.
Another argument would be that such a statute necessarily impinges
on the decision to abort because the very purpose of the law is to influ-
ence perceptions of fetal status so that women will not seek abortions in
the future. Official elevation of fetal status in this way burdens or inter-
feres with the autonomy of women contemplating family planning abor-
tions, by announcing the state's support of prenatal life, thus leading
women, who otherwise would abort, not to abort.1 34 Indeed what other
132. A ban on research with aborted fetuses (whatever the reason for the abortion) might also
interfere with a decision to abort, or with other reproductive decisions to the extent that it prevents
the development of information that would affect abortion and other reproductive decisionmaking.
See Note, State Prohibition of Fetal Experimentation and the Fundamental Right of Privacy, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1073, 1078-85 (1988). For example, the district court in Margaret S. v. Treen, 597
F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d
994 (5th Cir. 1986), found that a prohibition on research on fetal tissue could deny a woman infor-
mation that might influence her own future pregnancies. In addition, a prohibition on research
might curtail the development of prenatal diagnostic techniques such as amniocentesis by making it
impossible to examine fetal tissue that had been aborted. However, these considerations would apply
only insofar as the statute banned research on those topics; they would not apply to interference with
other kinds of research.
133. See supra note 132. However, one could argue that successful tissue transplants for those
diseases would lead women to get pregnant and abort in the future solely to obtain tissue for
transplant.
134. See Reproductive Health Serv. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1076-77 (8th Cir. 1988). Also
instructive here is the fate of fetal disposal laws. While constitutional challenges to fetal disposal
laws have usually succeeded on vagueness grounds, some federal district courts have struck down for
other reasons disposal laws that required aborted fetuses to be interred, buried or cremated. The
courts held that the laws convey the message that a fetus is a human being deserving the respect and
dignity of a formal burial, thus equating abortion with the taking of a human life. If such laws were
shown to burden the woman's decision to abort, they would be invalid. Such a burden was found
when the law required the woman to choose the means of disposal prior to the abortion. Leigh v.
Olsen, 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D. N.D. 1980). In another case the burden was less clear because the
woman would be informed of these options 24 hours after the abortion procedure. Margaret S. v.
Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 997-98 (5th Cir. 1986) (struck down on other grounds). See also Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. City of Cincinnati, 822 F.2d 1390, 1399 (6th Cir. 1987).
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purpose can attend such a ban, but an attempt to show the worth of the
fetus so that women will refrain from abortion?
The assumption underlying this objection, however, is that the state
must remain neutral about protecting prenatal status, and can never
"speak" on the issue for fear that its speech will persuade listeners to
change their future behavior. As the abortion funding cases make clear,
however, the state is not disqualified from speaking on abortion as long
as no interference thereby occurs. 135
Prohibiting the donation of fetal remains for research or therapy an-
nounces the government's view of the importance of respecting prenatal
life, but it does not prevent abortions for women who are not aborting to
produce fetal tissue for transplant. They may consider the government's
message and act on it or not, as they choose. If the state is free to com-
municate its views about prenatal status, the ban on use of fetal remains
will not unconstitutionally interfere with the decision to abort, even if
some women then decide not to abort. 136
c. The Right to Life or Health of the Recipient
Even if laws against tissue transplants with fetuses aborted for family
planning reasons met a rational basis test and did not impermissibly in-
terfere with a woman's right to abort, they still might interfere with the
right of potential transplant recipients to receive medical treatment nec-
essary for their life or health.
While the interest in receiving medical treatment has not, except in the
context of abortion and contraception, received explicit constitutional
protection, a cogent argument for such a right can be made.' 37 Consider
135. Harris v. Mcrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432
U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam). For further development of this point, see Hirt, Why the Government
Is Not Required to Subsidize Abortion Counseling and Referral, 101 HARV. L. RE v. 1895 (1988).
136. Some cases have suggested that the state's right to communicate its views regarding prena-
tal life is limited, because the purpose is to influence the woman's abortion decision. Of course, that
may be the purpose, but if the influence occurs merely from the presentation of information (here,
the information that the state takes a negative view of abortion), unconstitutional interference does
not occur. It is another matter, however, if the purpose of the law is to deprive women of disposi-
tional rights because they have aborted. Although a woman has no independent fundamental right
to control disposition of fetal or other tissue removed from her, depriving her of control over fetal
remains is not valid if the purpose is to penalize the underlying choice of procuring tissue by
abortion.
137. Roe v. Wade talks about the "right of the doctor and his patient to decide upon medical
care." However, courts have not recognized this point explicitly in other cases, with the exception of
Ballard v. Andrews, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Texas 1980). The district court in Margaret S. Y. Treen
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a situation in which a willing physician and patient wish to treat a life-
threatening illness with fetal tissue freely donated for that purpose-a
treatment shown by extensive research abroad to be safe and effective for
its intended purpose. 1 38 State law, however, prohibits transplants with
tissue from aborted fetuses in order to make a symbolic statement about
its view of the worth of fetuses. Would such a law, which we assume
would meet a rational basis test, be valid?
The validity of such a law would turn on whether the fourteenth
amendment right not to be deprived of "life or liberty without due pro-
cess of law" protects the right to receive safe and effective medical treat-
ments from willing physicians. A strong argument for subjecting such a
statute to a scrutiny stricter than rational basis can be made on the basis
of the plain meaning of the constitutional text. 1 39 The state, by this pro-
hibition, would be directly depriving the patient of "life," for without the
tissue transplant he would die. Moreover, the state prohibition would
deprive him of "liberty" if the ban on treatment impaired the patient's
physical mobility (as would be the case if severe Parkinson's disease or
diabetes were not treated). In either case, under strict scrutiny, the pur-
pose of deterring abortions or making a symbolic statement of fetal
worth would not justify the state's interference with the patients's life or
liberty.
While such an expansion of due process is novel, judicial recognition
of a person's fundamental right to receive medical treatment necessary to
restore life or physical movement should lie within accepted parameters
of constitutional interpretation. Requiring the state to show more than
disapproval of abortion to justify deprivation of a person's life or liberty
also recognized such a right in finding that a ban on research with aborted fetuses might violate the
"right to health" of the woman by denying her information of medical benefit beyond reproductive
decisionmaking by prohibiting procedures of immediate medical benefit to her, such as pathological
examination of tissues. 597 F. Supp. 636, 673 (E.D. La. 1984) aff'd on other grounds sub nom.,
Margaret v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986). See also Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462
U.S. 476, 486-87 (1983) (state may require pathological examination of fetal tissue from abortions
done in abortion clinics to protect health and safety of woman).
138. A more exotic hypothetical will focus the point even more sharply. Suppose the patient's
life depends upon taking a certain medicine derived only from the roots of a naturally occurring
plant-ginseng-that flourishes in the upper Midwest. A religious minority has come to believe that
removal of ginseng from the ground will cause the death of persons somewhere in the world, and
persuades the state to ban sale and possession of ginseng. Would such a law, which would deprive
other persons of the means necessary for them to live, be constitutional? In deciding that question,
should not a test more rigorous than rational basis be applied?
139. See supra note 127.
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(by preventing access to the only effective treatment possible) is not an
arbitrary judicial decision even if the ban on fetal tissue transplants from
aborted fetuses survives other attacks, it should not survive this one.
2. State Bans on Intrafamilial Transplants and Donor Designation
of Recipients
Rather than a broad ban on all use of fetal tissue, such as those that
currently exist in eight states, many commentators recommend a more
discriminating approach. They would ban fetal tissue transplants only
from abortions and pregnancies undertaken solely for that purpose, and
not from all family planning abortions. To achieve this purpose, they
recommend enacting a ban on fetal tissue donations to friends or family
members, or alternatively, denying the woman who aborts the right to
designate the recipient of a fetal tissue donation.1" Since future develop-
ments might create a need for such abortions, the constitutionality of
such bans deserves attention.
Bans on donor designation of recipient or intrafamilial donations cre-
ate a "Chinese Wall" between the tissue source and recipient to prevent
women from becoming organ farms, to prevent "abuse" or "degrada-
tion" of the reproductive process and to protect women from family pres-
sures to conceive and abort to provide tissue. 14 1 Concerns for fetuses
undoubtedly also enter into the movement for such laws.
While these purposes would easily satisfy a rational basis test, they
would appear to interfere with a woman's reproductive rights and the
recipient's right to effective health care.
a. Interference with the Right to Abort
A two-step evaluation is necessary to assess the impact on reproduc-
tive decisionmaking of laws that limit the donor's designation of recipi-
ents of fetal tissue. The first step is to consider their effect on women
who are already pregnant and wish to abort in order to donate fetal tissue
to a relative or friend in need. The second step considers the effect of
such laws on decisions to become pregnant in order to produce fetal tis-
sue for transplant.
A ban on donor designation of fetal tissue recipients would prevent a
140. See, eg., Danis, Fetal Tissue Transplants: Restricting Recipient Designation, 39 HASTINGS
L.J. 1079 (1988). For a statute that is framed in terms of the woman's motivation, see Mo. REV.
STAT. § 188.036 (1988).
141. See Danis, supra note 140, at 1092.
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pregnant woman from aborting in order to provide fetal tissue to a par-
ticular recipient. Does removal of a particular motivation for abortion
interfere with or burden the fundamental right to terminate pregnancy?
The argument is strong that it does. Roe v. Wade 142 appears to create
a right to terminate pregnancy regardless of the woman's motive for the
abortion. While the Court emphasized a woman's interest in avoiding
unwanted children as the underlying value or interest at stake in the
abortion decision, it imposed no limits on her right to terminate based on
her reasons for choosing to abort.143 The clear implication is that a preg-
nant woman's motive in ending her pregnancy is irrelevant, and that
state laws that conditioned abortion on particular motivations would be
invalid."4 Dislike of pregnancy and children, vanity, personal conven-
ience or sheer malice may all motivate a woman in deciding to terminate
pregnancy. A legal right to end pregnancy in order to obtain tissue for
transplant thus follows.
If this reading of Roe is correct, then prohibiting a pregnant woman
from aborting to provide fetal tissue by denying her the right to designate
a donor, or to donate to a relative, is invalid absent a compelling state
interest for this interference with the abortion decision.145 Clearly, the
goal of preventing abortions or protecting fetuses from degradation
would not suffice as compelling state interests because the woman's right
to devalue the fetus relative to other values is protected. Nor would
preventing her from being coerced or pressured into aborting for a family
member suffice either, because there are less restrictive ways of protect-
ing her autonomy without banning all abortions to produce tissue. 46 A
142. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
143. Id. at 155.; see Robertson, supra note 49.
144. An inquiry into motive for aborting a pregnancy would, in any case, be difficult to enforce
because a woman could easily lie about her motives for the abortion, claiming that her purpose was
to avoid the gestational burdens that pregnancy invariably involves. But cf Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 188.036 (1988).
145. The point is quite subtle, because the woman who may not designate the recipient is still
free to abort. Also, the woman has no inherent right to dispose of fetal tissue or designate the
recipient. Yet denying this right could interact with the abortion decision by limiting her autonomy
over that choice. An analogy would be a law that required all profits from publication of sexually
explicit, but nonobscene, films and books go to charity to help abused women. Although one could
still publish such material, the incentive to do so is lost if profits cannot be made. Since motivation
in publishing protected material is irrelevant to its legitimacy, such a ban would be unconstitutional.
Similarly, a ban on designating the recipient of fetal tissue should also be unconstitutional, because it
interferes with a motive for abortion, even though it does not prohibit the abortion per se, anymore
than publication of the sexual material is prohibited per se.
146. Doctors have developed such techniques for recruiting family members for kidney trans-
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ban on research use of aborted fetuses, enacted to prevent abortions done
to obtain fetal tissue, would thus appear invalid.
b. Interference with the Right to Conceive
If the state could not ban abortion to produce fetal tissue when the
woman is already pregnant (either directly or by banning intrafamilial or
donor designation of fetal tissue recipients), could it nevertheless ban
conception and pregnancy undertaken to procure tissue for transplant?
To pursue that goal, it would have to fashion a law that banned only
conceiving for that purpose, because, as argued in this Article, the wo-
man's right to abort to produce tissue--once pregnant-is protected.' 4 7
Would a precisely drafted law that penalized only conception to procure
tissue for transplant, and not the abortion itself, be valid?
The validity of such a law would depend upon whether a woman has a
right to initiate a pregnancy in order to produce fetal tissue for transplant
by abortion. Judicial recognition of such a right would depend on several
factors, including whether the parties are married, the woman's relation-
ship to the intended recipient, and whether conception occurs coitally or
noncoitally.
A strong argument for such a right (and against such a law) would
arise in the case of a married couple that conceives to produce tissue for
one of the partners, their offspring, or parents. The Supreme Court has
been so protective of the sexual privacy of married couple that any re-
striction on marital conception would probably be subject to the strictest
scrutiny. 148 Preventing fetuses from being treated as "mere means," or
protecting women from the physical and symbolic effects of being a "tis-
sue farm" would not seem substantial enough to justify the intrusion on
the couple's sexual privacy.' 49
The Court is more likely to uphold a law directed against coital con-
ception by unmarried persons for tissue procurement purposes. The key
plants. They interview the potential donor and if they find that he has been pressured or is reluctant
to donate, the physicians then inform all parties that the donor is excluded on medical grounds.
147. A ban on donor designation of recipients or on intrafamilial donation would not achieve the
purpose of banning only conceiving to procure tissue for transplant because it would also ban abor-
tions to procure tissue for transplant. Drafting and implementing such a law would, therefore, be
difficult. But cf Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.036 (1988).
148. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Robertson, Procreative Liberty and
the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983).
149. No doubt the married couple's privacy would be protected even if conception occurred
noncoitally.
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is whether the Court would recognize a fundamental right of heterosex-
ual sexual privacy. If it did, unmarried coitus would presumably be pro-
tected to the same extent as marital sex, whatever the motivation (and
result) of the coitus. If unmarried coitus were not constitutionally pro-
tected, then the state could prohibit unmarried sexual intercourse per-
formed with any motivation, including a desire to produce fetal tissue for
transplant. Given the Court's restrictive view of sexual privacy in Bowers
v. Harwick,t50 one cannot be confident that laws against conception by
unmarried persons for transplant purposes would fall.
What then about noncoital conception to produce fetal tissue by a wo-
man not married to the intended recipient or source of sperm? The right
asserted here is not sexual autonomy per se, but the right to control one's
body and reproductive capacity. The Court's decisions concerning birth
control and abortion, however, have not been based on a general right to
control one's body or reproductive capacity. Even though unmarried
persons have a right to avoid conception and gestation, or to carry a
pregnancy to term once they have conceived, it does not follow that sin-
gle persons have a right to conceive in order to go to term, or conceive in
order to abort. 51 If confronted with the question, the Court is more
likely to reject rather than recognize such a right.
Yet even restrictions on unmarried conception might be vulnerable to
attack if the woman is artificially inseminated to provide fetal tissue for a
sibling, a parent, a child or herself. Protection of one's own health and
family autonomy would then be added to the claim of a right to control
one's body and reproductive capacity. Given the blurry contours of fam-
ily autonomy, courts may well recognize the right to conceive when the
intended recipient is the woman's child, parent or sibling, the woman
herself, or the intended recipient has provided the sperm to produce the
fetal tissue in question.1 52 By contrast, a woman unrelated to the recipi-
150. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), upheld a state sodomy statute applied to homo-
sexual activity on moral grounds alone, because homosexuals did not have a fundamental right of
sexual privacy. Although Bowers dealt with homosexual rights, it hardly reassures persons who
claim a right to heterosexual privacy outside of marriage. It may be that courts will also decline to
apply strict scrutiny to fornication and sodomy laws applied to heterosexuals, thus allowing the
enforcement of particular moral views to satisfy the rational basis test courts use for legislation that
does not interfere with fundamental rights.
151. See Robertson, supra note 148, at 416-17.
152. While the Court has extended the notion of family privacy in the context of zoning restric-
tions, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), and decisions to marry or raise children,
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), it is difficult to predict how it would treat the novel
question presented here. In any event, in the absence of laws specifically banning such conception,
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ent probably could be barred from conceiving to produce fetal tissue that
is not genetically related to the recipient.153
In sum, laws that prohibit the woman who aborts from designating the
recipient of fetal tissue are invalid because they would prevent women
from aborting to obtain tissue for transplant. In addition, they might
infringe on the right of married couples to conceive as they will, and the
possible right of family members to contribute tissue or organs from their
body to save the life of a family member. However, arrangements to
produce fetal tissue that is not genetically related to the recipient could
be banned without interfering with fundamental reproductive rights.
c. The Recipient's Right to Medical Treatment
Even if laws against designation of donees, aimed at preventing abor-
tion and becoming pregnant to produce fetal tissue, did not interfere with
reproductive rights, they would still have to be tested against the recipi-
ent's right to receive essential health care. As we have seen, one can
make a cogent argument for such a right when conception and abortion
are necessary to obtain the fetal tissue essential to save the life or health
of a sick patient.154 The courts should then require that the state have a
more compelling purpose than demonstrating respect for fetuses or
preventing women from becoming "organ farms" if such interference
with the life and liberty of sick patients is to be justified. Absent more
compelling justification, such laws would be invalid.
The patient's right to health care would even cast doubt on laws that
banned payments to women to get pregnant and abort. If family plan-
ning abortions did not meet demand for fetal tissue transplants or if his-
tocompatibility became important, it might be essential to pay women to
undergo conception and abortion in order to provide the needed tissue.
the incest laws are not themselves a barrier to noncoital conception by a relative with the gametes of
a family member in order to provide them or others with fetal tissue. Of course, artificial impregna-
tion with the sperm of a family-related recipient or the relative of a recipient might raise powerful
psychological feelings in the woman, the recipient or the sperm donor, and brush up against some of
the policies behind incest and consanguineous marriage laws. The difference is that neither sexual
intercourse, which incest laws ban, nor marriage and birth of offspring, which laws against consan-
guineous marriage aim to prevent, is occurring. See generally Coleman, Incest: A Proper Definition
Reveals the Need for a Different Legal Response, 49 Mo. L. REv. 251 (1984).
153. States could ban such practices because conceiving to produce fetal tissue that is not geneti-
cally related to the recipient presumably does nothing to further one's own health or family auton-
omy. States may thus be able to stop programs that rely on nonrelated women to produce fetal
tissue for transplant without violating reproductive freedom.
154. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
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Laws banning payment would then interfere with the life or liberty of
recipients, and should be tested by a stricter scrutiny than if the effect on
recipients were marginal. With such serious deprivations, symbolic con-
cerns about commodification or denigration of human dignity might be
found to be an insufficient justification for such laws.' 55
Even if payments to donors are not necessary to procure tissue, fees
paid to for-profit agencies organized to retrieve and process fetal tissue
from aborted fetuses may be. Statutes banning the sale of fetuses may be
worded in ways that would prevent for-profit firms from charging the
profit that is essential for them to operate in this field.'56 If they did have
that effect, however, and nonprofit firms did not fill the gap, the courts
should apply the same rigorous scrutiny in determining the constitution-
ality of the law they would apply to any restrictions that deprived recipi-
ents of the tissue transplants necessary for their health.
VI. FEDERAL RESEARCH FUNDING AND REGULATION OF FETAL
TISSUE TRANSPLANTS
Federal regulations and federal funding policies for human subject re-
search will play an important role in the development and diffusion of
fetal tissue transplants. Federal research regulations will have a strong
influence on fetal tissue procurement and research practices far beyond
research that is directly funded by the federal government. 157 In addi-
tion, as a major player in biomedical research, federal funding may be
essential for the research necessary to perfect tissue transplants.
155. These concerns might not amount to a compelling state interest because they are moralistic
concerns over which reasonable people widely disagree. In general, symbolic or moralistic concerns
do not trump fundamental rights. The same argument could be made against federal and state laws
that prohibit sale of organs. See supra notes 93-94. The constitutionality of laws against organ sales
has not yet been challenged, perhaps because the lack of organs for transplant is due to considera-
tions other than the lack of financial incentives to motivate donors. See Robertson, supra note 67, at
80.
156. A statute that banned all "commercial use" of aborted fetuses, such as exists in Nevada,
would arguably prevent for-profit firms from processing and distributing fetal tissue for profit. NEV.
REV. STAT. § 451.015 (1985). The benefits to patients of for profit operations, however, may clearly
outweigh the symbolic gains of not sanctioning any commercial operations with fetal tissue. After
all, physicians are paid to perform abortions. See supra notes 93, 101-06 and accompanying text.
157. This is because institutions that receive federal funds generally must comply with federal
research regulations even if the research itself is not federally funded. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201-211
(1987). Also, such regulations have great influence, and are likely to be followed even when not
legally obligatory.
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A. Current Federal Regulations for Fetal Research
In 1975, in the aftermath of Roe v. Wade and great controversy over
fetal research, Congress created the National Commission for Protection
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Science Research to
advise on policy for research with fetuses and other human subjects." 8
Its recommendations for federally funded fetal research were promul-
gated in- 1976 as regulations 5 9 that specify additional duties of institu-
tional review boards "in connection with activities involving fetuses [and]
pregnant women. ' ' 6°
While these regulations focus on research with live fetuses that have
been or were intended to be aborted, one provision addresses the use of
dead fetuses in research. That provision states: "Activities involving the
dead fetus, macerated fetal material, or cells, tissue, or organs excised
from a dead fetus shall be conducted only in accordance with any appli-
cable state or local laws regarding such activities." 161
A striking feature of this regulation, which is still in effect, is that it
implicitly rejects the arguments against fetal tissue research canvassed in
this article. Research with dead aborted fetuses may be conducted as
long as state or local law permits it. With a few exceptions, state or local
law permits research with aborted fetuses when the mother consents. In-
deed, most states currently permit even research with fetuses conceived
and aborted to obtain tissue for transplant.1 62
Other provisions of the regulations restrict the circumstances of fetal
tissue procurement. They require that:
(3) Individuals engaged in the activity will have no part in: (i) Any deci-
sions as to the timing, method, and procedures used to terminate the preg-
nancy, and (ii) determining the viability of the fetus at the termination of
the pregnancy; and
(4) No procedural changes which may cause greater than minimal risk
to the fetus or the pregnant woman will be introduced into the procedure
for terminating the pregnancy solely in the interest of the activity.
(b) No inducements, monetary or otherwise, may be offered to terminate
pregnancy for the purposes of the activity.... 63
158. National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 202(b), 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
159. 45 C.F.R. § 46.201-211 (1987).
160. National Commission for Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search, Report and Recommendations: Research on the Fetus. 45 C.F.R. § 46.205 (1987).
161. 45 C.F.R. § 46.210 (1987).
162. See supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
163. 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(3),(4) (1987).
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These restrictions are typical of the protections recommended by other
commentators and advisory bodies for fetal procurement, and generally
are sound. 164 However, some potential problems should be noted. A
restrictive interpretation of "inducement" could prevent any discussion
with a pregnant woman prior to a decision to abort of her right to donate
fetal remains even though she might seek such information. 165  If
changes in the timing or method of abortion become necessary to procure
viable tissue, the regulations would prevent obtaining the tissue, even
though the woman freely consented and the changes did not so increase
the risk to the mother or to the fetus as to be ethically unacceptable. 166
Finally, there are limitations on who may request such changes, which
could block access to fetal tissue.1 67 If such provisions become barriers
to obtaining fetal tissue, they should be reexamined to assure that they
are ethically justified.
B. Federal Funding of Fetal Tissue Research and Therapy
While existing federal regulations permit transplants with tissue from
aborted fetuses, the question of whether the federal government should
164. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
165. Providing her with the requested information may be prohibited because it might serve as
the motivating factor in deciding to have an abortion. But this interpretation of "inducement"
should be rejected. See supra note 81.
166. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
167. The question here is whether the person requesting permission for the abortion or consent
to donation could request the woman to postpone the timing or change the method of abortion in
order to procure viable tissue for transplant. The answer to this question depends upon the interpre-
tation of the term "activity" as used in 45 C.F.R. § 46.206 (1987).
If the "activity" is the use of the donated tissue for research, then the person requesting permis-
sion for abortion and donation is not, strictly speaking, "engaged in the activity" and could make the
request. This interpretation views the tissue recipient as the subject of research and not the fetus that
is aborted or the pregnant woman.
On the other hand, if the "activity" is the abortion producing the fetal tissue, then even a person
on the staff of the abortion facility who does not request consent to or perform the abortion may be
unable to request such changes from the woman. So restrictive an interpretation would mean that
no such requests could ever be made unless proposed by the woman undergoing the abortion. Such
an interpretation should lead to a reevaluation of the policy behind the regulation. If concerns about
risk are met, and there is no threat of undue influence or making access to abortion contingent on
consent to postponement or a riskier method, then it is not clear what is gained by such a restrictive
interpretation of the regulations-other than blocking access to fetal tissue.
It appears that the Office of Protection of Research Risks (OPRR), which is the main implement-
ing agency of these regulations, takes the position that the woman and fetus that is going to be
aborted are the subject of the activity. However, it is not clear that the OPRR would find that
personnel at the abortion facility are barred from proposing such changes to a woman who has
already agreed to undergo an abortion.
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fund fetal tissue research nevertheless remains.1 6 A special panel was
recently convened by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to advise
the Assistant Secretary for Health on whether research programs involv-
ing fetal tissue transplants should be supported within or without
NIH.169 The panel recommended support for such research, with re-
strictions on tissue procurement comparable to the existing federal
regulations. 170
The question of federal funding of fetal tissue research merely repeats
the issues discussed earlier in this article. Because funding decisions or-
dinarily to not interfere with or infringe constitutional rights, the govern-
ment is not obligated to fund fetal tissue research (or therapy), no matter
how desirable it appears.' 71 As the NIH panel found, however, the argu-
ments strongly favor funding of such research. Of overriding importance
is the potential benefit to thousands of patients suffering from severe dis-
ease. Federal research funding may be necessary to develop new thera-
pies, such as fetal tissue transplants, to treat those diseases. Federal
funding will also allow the government to play a more active oversight
role than if it leaves the field entirely to private funding, as occurred with
in vitro fertilization research. 172
The arguments against federal research funding come from right-to-
life groups that would remove the federal government entirely from any
financial support of abortion in the United States. They fear that federal
financing of fetal tissue research will place an imprimatur of legitimacy
on abortion, and encourage abortion in subtle or even direct ways.
The NIH panel found that the abortion producing fetal tissue for
transplant research is sufficiently independent of research with that of
fetal tissue that federal funding of abortion may occur without implicat-
ing the government in abortion. Fears that research with tissue from
family planning abortions will legitimize abortion or retroactively impli-
168. The federal government has funded research with fetal tissue for many years. Last year, for
example, $12,000,000 of such research was funded. It is only the prospect of fetal brain transplants
that has led to the concern about funding of such research, perhaps because of the greatly increased
demand for fetal tissue that is foreseen.
169. Kolata, Federal Agency Bars Implanting of Fetal Tissue, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1988 at 1,
col.5.
170. Specter, Fetal Tissue "Acceptable'for Research, Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
171. The United States Supreme Court made this clear in finding that governmental refusal to
fund abortions for the indigent did not violate their constitutional rights. See supra note 135.
172. By funding no IVF research the federal government has left the field to private sector ac-
tors, who are free to research as they wish without any federal oversight.
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cate the government and recipients in the abortion itself are too specula-
tive to justify foregoing the potential benefits of fetal tissue transplant
research. 17
3
One can make the same arguments for funding research even when
pregnancy and abortion have occurred for the purpose of producing tis-
sue for transplant. Such a decision would, of course, be politically and
ethically more controversial. If the need were established, however, the
government could still fund the resulting research without also funding
the abortion that makes the research possible, though arguments that the
government is too closely implicated in such abortions will be strongly
voiced.
If the politics of abortion lead to withdrawal of direct government
funding of research with tissue from family planning abortions, the gov-
ernment should continue to fund other unrelated research at institutions
that conduct research with aborted fetal tissue with nonfederal funds. 174
While the government is free to so restrict its research funds, the sym-
bolic gains of refusing to fund other medical research in institutions do-
ing nonfederally funded research with aborted fetuses are too few to
justify the burden on researchers. Surely at that point the government's
link to abortion is too attenuated to claim any complicity in or encour-
agement of abortion.
Finally, the symbolic costs that arise when one considers federal sup-
port of fetal tissue research would also arise if fetal tissue transplants
became a proven therapy for Parkinson's disease, diabetes or other dis-
eases. While the government is not constitutionally obligated to fund a
given therapy, the arguments for federal funding of treatment are even
stronger than for federal funding of research, because the benefits to pa-
tients are clearer. A policy of denying Medicare or Medicaid funding for
therapeutic procedures using tissue from induced abortions would de-
prive needy patients of essential therapies in order to avoid speculative
concerns about governmental complicity and encouragement of abortion.
A more prudent approach would be to fund all therapies that meet the
general funding standards for these programs. At the very least, the gov-
173. See supra notes 27-39. A person opposed to abortion might reasonably conclude that the
pro-life cause is set back only marginally, if at all, by government funding of research with fetuses
aborted for reasons unrelated to tissue procurement. In any event, the government will not be fund-
ing the abortion that produces the tissue for transplant.
174. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). This case would permit the govern-
ment to withold such funds if it chose.
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ernment's funding policies should distinguish between therapies depen-
dent on tissue retrieved from family planning abortions and those
dependent on tissue from abortions performed to provide tissue for
transplant.
VII. TISSUE RETRIEVAL FROM LIVE FETUSES
The analysis of fetal tissue transplants has assumed that the fetus is
dead when the tissue is taken. This assumption is realistic because ninety
percent of abortions occur in the first trimester by suction curretage,
which invariably fragments the fetus, killing it in the process. 175 In some
cases, especially when the abortion occurs later in the pregnancy and
different abortion methods are used, fetuses may emerge alive, though
nonviable, from the abortion procedure. Could tissue be taken (with the
mother's consent) from such fetuses if other sources of viable tissue were
not available?
Fetuses that are alive and separate from the mother are legal persons,
and have all the rights of newborn infants even though their prematurity
is the result of a legal attempt through abortion to cause their death. If
they are viable, legally they must be kept alive and reasonable efforts
made to resuscitate them. 176 If they are nonviable but still alive (e.g.,
have spontaneous heart and lung action, or are not yet brain dead), there
is no legal obligation to resuscitate or to attempt to sustain their life.' 77
However, retrieving tissue or organs for transplant from nonviable liv-
ing fetuses before their death is legally restricted. Federal regulations
narrowly limit the activities that may be carried out on nonviable fetuses
ex utero. A nonviable ex utero fetus cannot be a subject in an activity
unless: (1) "vital functions of the fetus will not be artificially main-
tained," (2) "experimental activities which of themselves would termi-
nate the heartbeat of respiration of the fetus will not be employed," and
(3) the purpose is "the development of important biomedical knowledge
which cannot be obtained by other means."17'
Under this regulation, nonviable fetuses could not be artificially main-
tained until organs and tissue were removed, unless the purpose of the
175. Fine, supra note 5, at 5-6.
176. Commonwealth v. Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976).
177. There may be a legal obligation to attempt to sustain their life if the brief continuation of
their lives is in their interest. Terminally ill and inevitably dying patients still might have interests in
having their lives prolonged, even though they cannot be prolonged for very long.
178. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1987).
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research was to enable fetuses to survive to the point of viability. 7 9 In
addition, organs and tissue could not be harvested if the harvest proce-
dure itself "would terminate the heartbeat or respiration of the fetus,"
and the removal of organs and tissue for experimental transplants was
itself considered part of the "experimental activity." 80
State homicide laws would also restrict tissue retrieval from nonviable
ex utero fetuses until they were pronounced dead under normal heart-
lung or brain dead criteria. Removal of tissue or organs before death
would technically constitute murder, if the removal were the immediate
cause of death. The burdens and benefits of amending the law should be
considered when the need to retrieve organs and tissue from nonviable,
ex utero fetuses is shown. 181 In any event, even though commentators
sometimes do not distinguish between ethical objections to procuring tis-
sue from live, nonviable fetuses and the quite different objections to ob-
taining tissue from dead fetuses, policy should clearly separate the two.
Ethical and legal objections to taking tissue from live, nonviable fetuses
do not apply when the aborted fetus is dead."8 2
VIII. POLICY ISSUES IN DISTRIBUTING FETAL TRANSPLANTS
Resolution of the ethical issues that arise in fetal tissue procurement is
essential for research to proceed with fetal tissue transplants. If supply
side issues are solved and fetal transplants prove to be an effective ther-
apy for Parkinson's disease, diabetes and disorders of the blood and im-
mune system, difficult demand side issues will then arise. These issues
include the costs of such therapies, whether they should be financed with
both public and private funds, and whether special qualifications should
be required of physicians who offer fetal tissue transplants. If scarcity of
179. Protocols for maintaining anencephalic newborns on respirators for seven days after birth
in order to determine brain death for organ donation purposes thus would be prohibited, if the infant
involved qualified as a fetus under the federal regulations. See Walters & Ashwal, Organ Prolonga-
tion in Anencephalic Infants: Ethical and Medical Issues, HASTINGS CENTER REP. Oct.-Nov. 1988
at 19.
180. See discussion of this point at supra notes 176-77.
181. Robertson, Relaxing the Death Standard for Pediatric Organ Donations, in ORGAN SUBsTi-
TUTION TECHNOLOGY: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 69-77 (Mathieu ed. 1988).
182. However, problems may arise in determining brain death in a very premature infant. Uni-
form standards for determining brain death in such infants do not exist. Fine, supra note 5, at 6.
The federal regulations define "dead fetus" as a "fetus ex utero which exhibits neither heartbeat,
spontaneous respiratory activity, spontaneous movement of voluntary muscles, nor pulsation of the
umbilical cord (if still attached)." 45 C.F.R. § 46.203(f) (1987).
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viable tissue becomes a problem, important issues of allocation and dis-
tribution of fetal transplants will also arise.
Discussion of these issues is premature until more is known about the
success of fetal tissue transplants for particular disorders. In any event,
cost and scarcity issues are not unique to fetal tissue transplants. They
would arise with any new treatment that could drastically improve the
lot of millions of patients, and exist now with organ transplantation. The
demand side, however, might affect the number of fetuses needed to serve
patient needs, and thus cannot be ignored completely as long as abortion
remains controversial.
IX. CONCLUSION
This survey of issues suggest that ethical and legal concerns should not
bar research with fetal tissue transplants as a therapy for serious illness.
Although many persons have ethical reservations about abortion, a wide
range of opinion would likely support many research uses of fetal tissue,
particularly when the abortions occur for reasons other than tissue pro-
curement. In any event, constitutional status bars the government from
banning all research and therapeutic uses of aborted fetuses, though it is
not required to fund research or therapy with fetal tissue.
The use of fetal tissue inevitably implicates the strong feelings that
abortion engenders. The disparate issues raised, however, can be treated
separately, so that ethical concerns and the politics of abortion do not
impede the progress of important research. For example, transplants
with fetal tissue from family planning abortions do not necessarily entail
approval of pregnancy and abortion undertaken to produce tissue for
transplant. Nor will recognition of the mother's right to donate fetal
tissue inherently cause fetuses to be bought and sold, or women to be
paid to abort.
In the final analysis, fetal tissue transplants raise questions of symbolic
costs as much as questions of rights. The symbolic costs involved in us-
ing fetal tissue to cure serious disease cut in many directions. Sorting out
the symbolic and rights-based concerns about fetal tissue transplants will
help to respect both important ethical values and progress in medical
science.
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